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ACTION EVALUATION IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION1 
 
 
Marc Howard Ross 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Questions of evaluation are important to conveners, participants and funders of 
conflict resolution initiatives. Yet good evaluation is tied to a number of complicated 
questions concerning what constitutes success and failure in projects that may be multi-
dimensional or only part of an effort to settle a larger conflict. Rothman has offered 
Action Evaluation as a methodology that seeks to incorporate goal setting and 
evaluation into project designs. He argues that this will improve a project by 
monitoring the changing nature of goals through the life of a conflict resolution 
intervention, and action evaluation’s self-conscious attention to goal setting offers a 
mechanism for developing and committing an intervention to specific internal and 
external standards of evaluation. This article examines Action Evaluation as a theory of 
practice, considering its conceptual strengths and examining specific issues of its 
implementation. 
 
Introduction 
 
 How are conveners, participants and funders to decide if a conflict resolution 
initiative has been successful? The question is not easy to answer, especially in 
situations where a project suggests that its impact will be indirect and not necessarily 
visible in the short run. To date various inadequate solutions to this question of 
evaluation of conflict resolution initiatives have been proposed.2 Action evaluation 
offers a different approach to evaluation as it seeks to incorporate goal setting and 
evaluation into project designs, to recognize the changing nature of goals through the 
life of an intervention and to use a self-conscious attention to goals as a mechanism for 
developing and committing an intervention to both internal and external standards of 
evaluation (Rothman, 1997).3 
 My own interest in action evaluation comes from a concern with understanding 
the diverse goals of conflict resolution interventions in ethnic conflict (Ross and 
Rothman, 1999), and in puzzling over the question of how social science theory and 
methods can be more closely tied to practice. My approach to examining theories of 
practice in conflict resolution is to take seriously practitioners’ underlying, often 
unstated, assumptions about conflict and steps they take to deal with it. These beliefs, I 
have argued, are often central to understanding why the parties to a conflict act as they 
do, and why specific conflict management interventions are organized as they are 
(Ross, forthcoming). Making the core assumptions of practitioners explicit allows us to 
spell out their theories of practice to better understand actors’ motivation, to evaluate 
the extent to which their core beliefs are consistent with theory and evidence and to 
refine both theory and practice to the benefit of each. 
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 I use this approach to examine the theory and practice of action evaluation asking 
what its core assumptions are and trying to make explicit how it seeks to achieve the 
specific effects it wants. Rothman proposes action evaluation as a method for 
improving practice and potentially contributing to a clearer understanding of the theory 
underlying conflict resolution as well. “This methodology is intended to help project 
organizers, facilitators, participants, and funders interactively define their shared goals, 
as their project evolves and effectively monitor and assess them” (Rothman,1999b 2).  
 In this article, I first discuss the concept of theory of practice; next, I examine 
action evaluation; then, I consider how action evaluation has been used in specific 
conflict resolution projects, and lastly, I suggest areas where the theory of action 
evaluation requires further development, additional theoretical specification, and 
empirical analysis. 
 
Theories of Practice 
 
 All practice is grounded in beliefs about the nature of social and psychological 
reality. These beliefs, which help us understand why and how practitioners’ activities 
produce their intended effects, are often more implicit than explicit. Making them 
explicit permits us to identify the core assumptions of specific theories of practice, to 
articulate indicators that could help us evaluate if given theories are correct, and to 
revise practice when core assumptions are imprecise or unwarranted.  
 Any theory of the practice makes important assumptions about the following: the 
nature of conflict with an emphasis on the specific domains or “problem areas” to 
which it pays particular attention, the specific effects good practice is expected to have 
on participants in interventions, the possible impact a practice can have on the course 
of a conflict beyond those it has directly on the participants in an intervention, images 
of what a successful settlement of conflict looks like, and hypotheses about the 
mechanisms by which the project achieves its impact (Ross, forthcoming). Elsewhere I 
have examined six different theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution, 
community relations, principled negotiation, human needs, psychoanalytically rooted 
identity, intercultural miscommunications, and conflict transformation, in an effort to 
spell out the very different activities and contrasting ideas about success which are 
consistent with each of these theories (Ross, forthcoming). That analysis showed that 
while alternative theories rarely directly contradict each other, they do emphasize quite 
different processes and sequences of activities. For example, where community 
relations focuses on local institution building and empowerment, human needs theory 
stresses the identification of the parties’ non-negotiable, underlying needs and 
consideration of how the needs of each party are often not incompatible with those of 
the others.  
 Central to my argument is that underlying all theories of practices are judgments 
about what success and failure in conflict resolution entails. What does it mean to 
settle, resolve, or manage an ethnic conflict successfully?4 An examination of different 
theories suggests significant variation in the criteria of success which each does (or 
could) articulate and emphasize. Equally important, particular approaches to conflict 
resolution differ in how they envision what Kelman (1995) calls the “transfer process,” 
the linkage between how the effects of conflict resolution are extended from those  
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relatively small number of people who participate directly in conflict resolution 
activities and changes in the larger conflict between ethnic communities.  
 Different notions of what is success follow from different theories of practice. For 
example, although each of the six theories of practice I mention above can be said to 
share the goal of resolving ethnic conflict, there are significant differences between 
them in what exactly this means (Ross, forthcoming). For example, community 
relations work seeks to improve communication and intergroup understanding, promote 
tolerant acceptance of diversity, and encourage building structures that safeguard the 
rights of all. Principled negotiation tries to bring about positive sum (win-win) 
agreements between the parties. Human needs theory emphasizes that the recognition 
of how each party in a conflict has some similar needs and is a prerequisite to joint 
action. Psychoanalytically informed identity theory tries to build analytic empathy5  
between the parties, to encourage a sense that agreement between the parties is possible 
and to lower the parties fears so they are more able to explore alternatives to continuing 
confrontation. Intercultural (mis)communication theory’s goal is to enhance effective 
communication by increasing the parties’ knowledge of each other and by weakening 
negative stereotypes. Conflict transformation theory attempts to change relationships 
among the parties through moral empowerment, justice, forgiveness, reconciliation, 
and recognition. 
 The capacity to process information from one’s environment as a basis for 
choosing specific actions is a central feature of human behavior. To process new 
information from the environment as a first step towards undertaking action requires 
the existence of some sort of model of the world, what many social psychologists and 
cultural anthropologists call a schema, which is used to interpret what the new 
information means and its consequences for action (D’Andrade, 1992). The schemas 
social psychologists describe contain assumptions about how the world one lives in 
works, about the motives of different social actors, and about the consequences of 
action on others. All social actors possess such schemas or theories about the world. 
Schemas differ from each other, however, in how explicit and elaborate they are.6 
 At the core of theories of practice are the principles that guide action. Making 
these principles explicit is important because it allows the different stakeholders in a 
project to discuss them and to consider how they are tied to a project’s goals. Action 
evaluation recognizes that self-consciousness about a project’s core assumptions and 
about stakeholders goals is not automatic. Rather, it argues that specific procedures are 
often needed to increase self-awareness, active reflection and choice making to guide 
projects as they evolve and as they try to decide when, and how, they have been 
successful. As a result action evaluation contains its own theory of practice at the core 
of which is integrating careful goal articulation and monitoring into practice more 
generally, will facilitate project design, promote effective evaluation, and improve the 
validity and reliability of ethnic conflict resolution efforts. 
 
Action Evaluation 
 Rothman (1997) presents action evaluation as a method for integrating evaluation 
into the practice of conflict resolution training and interventions. His starting point is 
the belief that current conflict resolution efforts are poorly served by standard pre and 
post training evaluation in which participants are asked the extent to which broad 
general goals articulated at the outset of a project, such as an intensive training, have 
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been achieved, or where conveners develop a post-hoc imprecise design to decide what 
is the impact of their project. Instead, action evaluation encourages an active and 
continual focus on goal definition and achievement throughout an intervention. 
Through self-conscious engagement with project goals and their evolution, participants 
can become much more explicit about what, why, and how they are seeking particular 
goals and in the process they become far more committed to their achievement. 
Furthermore, Rothman (1999b: 2) hypothesizes that such self-conscious engagement in 
also likely to raise the chance for success.  
 Many conflict resolution interventions, Rothman suggests, are motivated by the 
moral importance of the conflicts they seek to resolve rather than explicit project goals 
which drive the specific daily activities of the interveners. As a result, it is often 
difficult to know the extent to which a project’s activities affected either the 
participants with whom they work or the larger conflict in which the intervention is 
embedded. A parallel problem is that too many projects engage in activities that are not 
clearly connected to a project’s goals, often because the goals are formulated too 
vaguely for projects to link activities and goals effectively. 
 Action evaluation incorporates goal setting, monitoring and evaluation into a 
conflict resolution initiative rather than seeing these as distinct activities to be 
conducted independently and at different points in time. It seeks to make explicit the 
goals and motivations of all stakeholders, to analyze how these evolve over time, and to 
encourage the stakeholders to use the goals which have been identified as a step 
towards identifying explicit, contextually defined, criteria of success by which a project 
might be judged. 
 Action evaluation is a goal driven process in several senses. First, it seeks to make 
explicit the wide range of goals that inform an intervention. It does this by asking the 
relevant actors in an intervention to identify their goals, to say why they care about 
them (what motivations are driving them), and to identify how they think the goals can 
be most effectively met. Goal statements are collected at various stages from a project’s 
organizers and the participants in the intervention. In addition Rothman (personal 
communication) seeks to engage funders as active and explicit partners in the goal 
setting process to help develop more realistic and partnering attitudes among funders 
and to shape future funding policy. 
 Second, through the work of a project member, the action evaluator, and an 
individual particularly charged with the responsibility for collecting and analyzing the 
project’s goals, the goals are then summarized and presented back to the stakeholders 
in a project. This is done in several stages and at several levels of aggregation to 
establish a project’s baseline goals, to identify the shared, divergent and unique goals 
within and between the conveners, participants and donors, and then to map the goal 
evolution. By making the participants self-conscious about their project’s goals, action 
evaluation seeks to promote a reflection about, and shared commitment to, the project 
itself. 
 Third, action evaluation seeks to use the process of tracking and monitoring goals 
as a way toward developing contextualized standards (or criteria) of success, which can 
be employed for internal and external evaluation. The internal standards are needed if a 
project is to be self-correcting as it reacts to both changes in the conditions of a 
conflict, and as it learns which of its goals (i.e. those which all stakeholding groups 
have set) have or have not been successfully achieved. External standards are those that 
outside evaluators and others can use to determine the extent to which a project has 
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established and met meaningful goals in terms of the larger conflict in which it is 
embedded. 
 Core assumptions of action evaluation. Underlying action evaluation are several 
crucial assumptions that are consistent with a great deal of social science theory and 
evidence which offer strong support for the method.  
 The participation hypothesis. A basic and well-supported proposition underlying 
action evaluation is the idea that people will be more committed to goals that they 
articulate and establish themselves. Dubbed the participation hypothesis, Verba (1961: 
206-43) and many others find a great deal of evidence for the proposition that active 
involvement in a process builds commitment. The participation hypothesis suggests 
initial commitment can first be built by eliciting goals from participants and that 
additional commitment occurs when participants are asked to join together to reflect 
upon project goals. One reason is because people become invested psychologically 
when they spend time on an activity. Another is that participation builds a new social 
identity that is sustained, at least in part, by working toward common goals. Lederach’s 
(1995; 1997) concept of elicitive conflict resolution has participants define a situation 
and design their own contextually relevant action program; it clearly builds on the 
participation hypothesis’ emphasis on participants’ motivations and commitments. 
 Action evaluation’s impact, and the participation mechanism, also finds support in 
the Hawthorn effect; that is, the fact that participants at all levels are asked questions 
and involved in the process of program design builds support for the program and 
increases commitment to its goals. While some view this effect as an example of the 
problems of doing field research, the action researcher sees this finding as an 
opportunity to direct an outcome in a favorable direction (Argyris et al, 1985). From 
this point of view, it is not the specific goals which participants identify which becomes 
crucial in the process as much as the involvement in the process that increases their 
engagement in the process and their desire to achieve successful outcomes.  
 As part of action evaluation’s attention to participation in goal setting and 
evaluation is its implicit attention to strengthening cognitive and affective links among 
participants through their involvement in goal identification and achievement. The 
method, as Rothman has developed it to date, stresses the Action Evaluator as the core 
person collecting and analyzing the goals of different participants. However,  it should 
also be pointed out that action evaluation also promotes discussion and negotiation 
about goals among conveners, participants, and funders and pays particular attention to 
having each group consider similarities and differences among their members with its 
attention to shared, unique and opposing goals as part of their self-reflection and 
mutual engagement.  
 Goal setting as an iterative, incremental process. Action evaluation is rooted in 
the premise that goal setting and evaluation are iterative processes that reflects both 
participants’ changing concerns, understandings, and the shifting contexts in which 
conflicts are situated. As a result, action evaluation explicitly rejects the notion that it is 
desirable for initiatives to fully articulate project goals at the outset and to fail to 
modify them over time. Rather, it is based on the belief that incremental (and sometime 
large scale) changes in goals should be incorporated into project designs.  
 Effective feedback, of course, is crucial to any interactive process of goal 
modification and action evaluation provides at least two different kinds of feedback to 
participants. One asks the Action Evaluator to summarize and analyze the participants’, 
conveners’, and funders’ goals which are presented for discussion to each group at 
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various points in time. In addition, the method also asks the Action Evaluator to track 
goals, changes, and continuities over time and to feed these back to participants as well. 
The objective here is to make participants more self-consciously aware of how their 
thinking and that of other participants has shifted as a mechanism for building 
commitment to the achievement of a project’s  evolved goals. 
 The emphasis on iterative, incremental processes in action evaluation builds upon 
the analysis of effective organizational decision-making which Lindbloom (1959) and 
March and Simon (1958) provided more than a generation ago. They argued that 
problem identification and the development of solutions occurs in a context of 
imperfect information and changing priorities and understandings. In such settings, 
good decisions, what they call satisficing rather than optimizing ones, are those which 
result from continuing responses to changes and feedback, not large scale, one-time 
actions. Certainly March and Simon’s ideas about limited rationality apply to most 
conflict situations, and therefore action evaluations iterative, incremental approach is 
likely to do better than broad top-down procedures which are not subject to regular 
self-monitoring feedback and adjustment.  
 The social construction of goals. Action evaluation emphasizes that project goals 
need to be both specific and contextually relevant. As a result, an implicit objective of 
the method is to make participants seriously reflect on and discuss their goals, so they 
will be less likely to accept vague, general goals such as bringing peace to a long-time 
troubled region. Instead a central part of the action evaluator’s task is to help the 
different stakeholders articulate more specific goals and to be aware of their reasons for 
holding them. The process of self-conscious reflection seeks to get people to articulate 
detailed, meaningful objectives through an iterative process involving goal setting, 
discussion, and action across stakeholding groups.  
 Because action evaluation obliges participants to discuss their goals, and the 
motivations underlying them, and to suggest how they think their the goals can be most 
effectively met, action evaluation pushes all stakeholders to consider the relationship 
between their goals and a project’s capacity and its specific activities. As a result, the 
formation and explicit articulation of objectives is understood to occur in a social 
context and is promoted through the active engagement of the Action Evaluator. This 
process recognizes not only the social nature of goal construction, but also that it is a 
process that can be nurtured and encouraged when interventions wish to pay attention 
to it. 
 The social nature of goals is linked to action evaluation’s emphasis on an active 
process of goal setting and analysis. While different groups of stakeholders may not 
always be comfortable articulating and examining their goals, action evaluation 
implicitly suggests that the social dynamic engendered through the process creates its 
own social context that can foster group identification and commitment. What is left 
somewhat ambiguous in Rothman’s formulation is the extent to which the emerging 
social ties among stakeholders are simply functional, working relations and the degree 
to which they are to be affective as well. 
 Theory and practice are interrelated, not separate, phenomena. Rothman cites 
John Maynard Keynes’ famous remark that there is nothing so practical as a good 
theory to emphasize the importance of strongly linking theory and practice. Action 
evaluation is founded on the belief that reflexive practice must take theory seriously 
and that good theory must find strong support in practice. The linkage between the two 
is actively sought in action evaluation by forcing practitioners to articulate their core 
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assumptions while recognizing that this is not always easy to do. In fact, a key role of 
the Action Evaluator is to help those involved in a project to do this where they are not 
fully comfortable with the process, and to translate the specific, operational statements 
of practitioners into more theoretical terms. 
 
The Practice Of Action Evaluation 
 Much of Rothman’s inspiration for action evaluation comes from the long 
tradition of action research, which he traces from Kurt Lewin to Chris Argyris. 
Rothman argues just as good theory and practice each improve the other, well-done 
evaluation is necessary to improve practice. To link practice and evaluation, he has 
tried to develop a strategy which forces conflict resolution interventions to pay more 
explicit attention to the analysis of project goals. As discussed in the previous section, 
Rothman’s approach assumes that a self-conscious focus on goals will (1) help clarify 
them for stakeholders, (2) move stakeholders to a consensus on appropriate, 
contextually defined goals for an intervention, and (3) assist in the definition of 
standards to evaluate the extent to which a project has or has not been successful.  
 Each project’s Action Evaluator plays a key role in collecting and analyzing goals, 
but the process also requires that other members of a project see the value in what can 
be a somewhat tedious and time-consuming process. In addition, his approach requires 
that participants are willing and able to articulate their goals and trust the process will 
meet their needs and interests. But this doesn’t occur all at once.  
 
  [Rather] this is an ideal towards which action-evaluation strives and 
if it is successful develops over time. The Action Evaluator is the 
first repository of this confidence that is then widened to include 
conveners, participants, and perhaps, funders. A long and probably 
never completely successful process of transfer is clearly better 
than non-efforts made for inclusion and buy-in. At least all voices 
are heard” (Rothman, personal communication). 
 
 Perhaps the best way to understand how action evaluation works is to examine it 
in the context of a few of the more than a dozen projects in which Rothman and his 
associates have used it to date. While I will describe action evaluation in several 
different interventions, my discussion of its use is limited by the fact that in no case yet 
did an intervention use action evaluation for a long enough period to track important 
changes in goals over time; nor has one yet proceeded to the point where the process 
produced clear standards for evaluating the project’s success as Rothman hopes the 
method will do when it is carried out over a longer period of time. 
 Communication/Decisions/Results (CDR) Associates’ work with the Stara Zagora 
Multi-Ethnic Commission in Bulgaria illustrates some important dynamics of action 
evaluation and how its use is tied to a specific context. CDR’s project in Bulgaria 
sought to build cross-ethnic cooperation between the Bulgarian majority and several 
minority groups including the Roma and Turks. As part of its work, through a 
partnership with the Foundation on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution in Sofia and 
the Open Education Centre, CDR helped establish multi-ethnic commissions that seek 
to address local, and especially, minority problems in several Bulgarian towns. Action 
evaluation began with interviews with four stakeholder groups: sponsors, supervisors, 
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conveners, and participants (Ghais, n.d.: 2). Ghais’ analysis of the data from these 
interviews showed important differences in emphasis within and between the 
stakeholder groups. 
 The participants saw the Commission as a potentially important way to help the 
underprivileged minorities in Bulgaria. Ghais points out the participants’ commitment 
to joint problem solving and a sense of optimism among them that the Commission can 
make a real difference in the lives of people in the community. The interviews with 
participants made a number of explicit references to minorities’ social and economic 
problems that they wanted to see addressed, perhaps in coordination with local 
government and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s).  
 The conveners, while also expressing an interest in helping needy minorities, 
placed more emphasis on improving interethnic relations though increasing tolerance, 
conflict resolution, social integration, and even the use of the Commission as a model 
for interethnic cooperation in Bulgaria. The supervisors while sharing the goals of 
enhancing intergroup understanding and the development of effective models, also 
wanted to enhance their own experiences and knowledge about the cultures of 
Bulgaria’s minorities and their own conflict resolution skills. Finally, the sponsors 
emphasized the Commission project as part of Bulgaria’s transition to democracy and 
as a way of creating a culture of democracy and dialogue.  
 In analyzing differences in specific goals across groups, Ghais (n.d.: 7) points out: 
 
  The four groups fall along a spectrum in terms of their goals for the 
Stara Zagora Commission. At one end of the spectrum, the 
participants seem most concerned with helping minorities through 
charitable work: helping them find jobs, improving education and 
health care. (The conveners share these goals but also hold others.) 
At the other end of the spectrum the sponsors see the project as part 
of building a culture of dialogue and democracy. This spectrum of 
goals can also be see as going from tangible, results-oriented goals 
(providing relief for the problems of the poor) to more intangible, 
esoteric goals (instilling a culture of dialogue).  
 
 In her role as Action Evaluator, Ghais found that in response to the question of 
how they might accomplish their goals, there was agreement across all four groups 
concerning their desire to institutionalize and strengthen the Commission and to bring 
people from different ethnic groups together. Furthermore, none of the goals of any of 
the groups are incompatible with those others identified. At the same time, there are 
clearly differences in priorities and she concludes that, “Which of these activities are 
given priority depends on which understanding of the nature of the Commission 
prevails. If the goal is to bring about intergroup harmony in Bulgaria, a particular goal 
such as helping children stay in school is less important than the intergroup 
collaboration in achieving any goal” (Ghais, n.d.: 7). 
 In this project, the Action Evaluator prepared an analysis of the different 
stakeholders goals which the supervisors and conveners then reflected on with the aim 
of reaching agreement on the direction of the Stara Zagora Commission’s activities and 
which was then to be discussed with the participants. The aim of such analysis and 
discussion is to raise awareness concerning differences in emphasis as well as areas of 
agreement while moving stakeholders toward consensus and clearer shared 
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understanding of where a project should be headed. The practice of action evaluation 
views baseline data such as these as important because they help stakeholders 
understand both their own and others’ goals after the Action Evaluator (and possibly 
others on the project) analyze the data and present it back to the stakeholders in a useful 
form. Exactly what form goals should be presented to stakeholders will vary across 
projects and cultural contexts. They might be presented in a written document or orally; 
it can begin with separate meetings for each stakeholder group but can easily move 
toward sessions with more than one and joint exploration of both their similarities and 
differences as well as the future direction of a project.  
 Examining several other projects it is clear that the baseline data the Action 
Evaluator collected are important in revealing very different emphases among 
stakeholders, and the systematic analysis of stakeholder goals forced the project to 
consider how they might be incorporated into the project’s work rather than simply 
smoothed over. For example, in the Zichron Forum project in Israel while many of the 
founders were intellectuals most interested in fostering a dialogue between religious 
and secular Jews, the primary concerns of many of the participants were with social 
welfare issues. As the differences between the groups surfaced, there was a great deal 
of rancor as each tried to assert the priority of its goals. Finally, the action evaluation 
process led the participants to recognize that the different goals were not necessarily 
contradictory and to recognize it was possible to attend to both sets of goals. Similarly, 
the Action Evaluation data in the CIC Project in Yellow Springs Ohio, a forum to 
address issues of the town’s development, revealed a sharp split between people 
favoring social and cultural improvement of the community and those emphasizing 
economic development. The process which identified differences at first made 
participants uncomfortable because of the different directions each orientation would 
move the project However, when the Action Evaluation project also encouraged the 
stakeholders to work with, and address, their differences, rather than pretending they 
didn’t exist, the participants were more comfortable.  
 To date no project has yet employed action evaluation from initiation to 
conclusion of its work. The spirit of action evaluation, however, encourages us to 
reflect on the practice as it develops, rather than waiting for the completion of one or 
more applications before reacting to it. Clearly, a core strength of action evaluation is 
its capacity to build empowerment through the encouragement of stakeholder 
awareness of their own and others’ goals and motives. Used effectively, we might 
expect action evaluation to help projects evolve and persevere where many might 
otherwise expect them the end. At the same time, at the early stage of the development 
of this practice, there are still issues needing further attention, a question to which I 
now turn.  
 
Issues Needing Further Attention in Action Evaluation 
 There are a number of theoretical and practical issues that require further attention 
as action evaluation develops. The seven issues I raise ask both how interveners can 
integrate action evaluation into their work and suggest avenues for additional research 
and theory development that would demonstrate why and how action evaluation can 
improve conflict resolution interventions. 
 The role of the Action Evaluator. In several of the projects in which Rothman has 
piloted, the Action Evaluator has felt frustrated and was not certain that the conveners 
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or participants were committed to the method and its procedures. In some cases, this 
was because action evaluation takes time, something that is not always readily 
available. In other cases there were concerns about confidentiality and fears that direct 
questions about goals might produce more problems than returns. Another issue is that 
sometimes the designated action evaluator was not a full member of the project team 
and their work was too easily seen as being at cross-purposes with the initiative. Some 
project conveners in some cultural and political contexts are uncomfortable with the 
direct questions action evaluation poses to participants and believe they may even 
anger and alienate some participants. More generally the concern of some is that action 
evaluation’s step-by-step process is inconsistent with how many non-western cultures 
approach problem solving. 
 All of this means the role of the Action Evaluator needs to be more carefully 
thought out and perhaps Rothman needs to consider a range of ways in which the role 
can be filled. At the same time, whatever decision is reached about the Action 
Evaluator’s role in any project, there needs to be a widespread project commitment to 
action evaluation for it to be successful. Without support conveners or participants who 
want to undermine the process can easily do so.  
 Making goals explicit and monitoring changing goals increases the likelihood 
they will be achieved. At the core of action evaluation is the hypothesis that making 
goals explicit and monitoring changes in stakeholder goals increases the chances that 
the goals will be met and that an intervention will be successful. While Rothman is 
probably right that increasingly self-awareness of goals is linked to commitment to 
their achievement, action evaluation needs to be more explicit about why this is the 
case, to identify situations in which this proposition is particularly like to hold and to 
consider others in which it is likely to be more problematic.  
 There are several different possible underlying dynamics at work here. As is 
suggested above, each could have somewhat different implications for practice. First, it 
may be that focusing on stakeholder goals is an effective mechanism to increase 
commitment to a project, as participants feel empowered because they are asked about 
their priorities. Second, it may be the case that clarification of goals and their 
prioritization makes people more focused in their project activities and this increases 
their effectiveness as participants’ data and input are used to design (and redesign) 
initiatives. Third, it may be that identification of, and attention to, specific goals 
heightens stakeholder’s motivation. Fourth, it is plausible to suggest that eliciting goals 
and discussing them heightens the social and emotional connections within and 
between different stakeholders that provides a cadre of persons prepared to work for 
the resolution of the larger conflict. While each of these mechanisms are plausible and 
not necessarily at odds with each other, collecting evidence on the extent to which each 
is operating and the strength of their effects is necessary to support claims about how 
and why action evaluation is effective. 
  Action evaluation may be far more appropriate in certain kinds of conflicts than 
others. It is worth considering the conditions under which the conflict resolution 
mechanisms at the core of action evaluation are most likely to comes into play and 
where goal identification and analysis are most likely to move a conflict closer to 
resolution. (The reverse is to consider situations when they are likely to be particularly 
ineffective.) Asking this question reminds us of possible limits to conflict resolution 
more generally, and how in some intransigent conflicts explicit attention to 
disagreement about goals can sometimes harden differences among the parties. As a 
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result, there may be differences across conflicts in the extent to which action evaluation 
can be effective, and identifying some of action evaluation’s limits may be particularly 
useful as interveners decide whether it is appropriate in the conflict on which they are 
working.7 It is easy, for example, to imagine bitter, intractable conflicts where the 
parties are not yet ready to share their goals with opponents in any kind of frank and 
open process which action evaluation requires. 
 Participants in an intervention can effectively develop criteria of success to 
evaluate the extent to which the larger conflict is or is not moving toward resolution. 
One of the most interesting ideas action evaluation develops is the process of goal-
setting among stakeholders in an intervention can lead to the development of 
meaningful standards for evaluation contextually for individual projects and then across 
projects. What is not spelled out however is how it occurs. One potential problem is 
that not all people involved in an intervention necessarily are comfortable thinking in 
operational terms and can easily identify specific indicators of success. Getting people 
to be sufficiently operational may not be so easy in some contexts, and many conveners 
will probably feel tension because of the time and energy it requires and the stress it 
produces on some participants.8  
 In addition, while particular stakeholders may develop clear operational goals, 
there is not necessarily any assurance that there will be agreement across stakeholders 
or between different groups of participants about what the goals should be or how they 
might be measured. While Rothman suggests that negotiations among the stakeholders 
are necessary to achieve agreement on goals, it may be the case that problems are an 
indicator of the larger conflict and not something that stakeholders can easily negotiate. 
When presented with such a dilemma, conveners will have to make decisions about 
how much time and effort to devote to this process and when avoidance of explicit 
differences among participants is the best short-run strategy. There may then be strong 
differences between how conveners think it is best to proceed and the what the action 
evaluation process asks them to do. 
 Forcing participants to establish a common set of goals may result in a tendency 
to accept the least common denominator related to only those few goals that are not 
controversial and relatively easy to achieve. One possible outcome to a difficult 
situation is that participants will only agree on those few, general goals that are either 
not problematic and/or relatively easy to achieve. While this meets action evaluation’s 
demand that specific goals be articulated, it may undermine the overall value of an 
intervention. In addition, a too-narrow demand for agreement on specific goals may 
create real tension between the Action Evaluator and other members of the project in 
ways that turn many participants against the action evaluation process.  
 The problem here is that action evaluation the process of articulating and 
monitoring goals can have a great deal of tension associated with it, and there needs to 
be more explicit attention paid to how to deal with situations where action evaluation’s 
procedures are an important source of stress. The Action Evaluator and other conveners 
may come to believe that alternative, more indirect, approaches to goal articulation and 
monitoring are needed, and yet action evaluation as Rothman spells it out does not 
make clear how this might be achieved.9 
 Action evaluation generates many goal statements, yet it not yet clear what is the 
best way in which these are to be analyzed and how their analysis best ties into conflict 
resolution goals. Collecting goal statements from different stakeholders in an initiative 
is one thing; deciding how to makes sense of and use these statements is another. 
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Before developing action evaluation, Rothman (1999a) reports an intervention in the 
Cyprus conflict in which he sorted over two hundred goal statements into ten groups on 
the basis of their similarity in content. He expresses the hope that such categorization 
and sharing the groups of goals with participants will help them see connections among 
goals and can help interveners understand general goals for the field. However, it is not 
yet clear what the connection is between goal classification and action. 
 Action evaluation needs to explore additional ways to analyze and use the goals 
stakeholders identify. One avenue to develop involves goal prioritization. At the 
simplest level, this is about rankings and distinguishing among goals that are ranked 
highly and those that are not. A further step might be to identify particular goals 
stakeholders see as critical or essential from their perspective and to emphasize their 
importance in any analysis or group discussion of goals, especially in situations where 
they may be at odds with other’s high priority goals. At present degrees of agreement 
across goals are calculated, but a measure of intensity could also be developed to get at 
prioritization.  
 Another possible dimension for goal analysis would distinguish among process 
goals involving the participants in the intervention and substantive outcome goals. The 
latter could be divided between outcome goals which primarily involve the intervention 
participants and those which concern the wider conflict; an example of the first might 
be that participants in a workshop develop a keener appreciation of the other side’s 
perception of what is at stake in the conflict, while the latter could be that 
confrontations and violent incidents between groups in a town diminish over the next 
year.  
 Action evaluation is ultimately a form of third party intervention and as such must 
be evaluated as other forms of intervention are.10 Emphasizing goal articulation, their 
explicit recondition and efforts to build consensus around project goals, their 
prioritization, and criteria of success, does not obviate the need to ask whether this is 
the ‘best way’ of intervening in any given conflict. Action evaluation emphasizes goal 
articulation and the definition of success, but in fact has little to say about how success 
should be measured or how measures of success it develops might differ from those 
that other methodologies generate. In fact, it is important to recognize that the internal 
generation of goals can, at times, be self-serving and collusion among different active 
participants may result in avoiding difficult problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper has attempted to describe the key elements and core assumptions of the 
practice of action evaluation. I have argued the approach makes four crucial 
assumptions consistent with a great deal of social science theory and evidence: the 
impact of participation on attitudes and behaviors, goal setting as an iterative and 
incremental process, the social construction of goals, and the interrelationship between 
theory and practice. These assumptions are important in helping us understand why 
Rothman advocates action evaluation as a way of building stakeholder awareness of, 
and commitment to, goals in conflict resolution projects.  
 Action evaluation is a strategy for making stakeholders in conflict resolution 
projects pay explicit attention to their own and others’ goals and motives. The 
underlying hypothesis is that self-reflection assists stakeholders in clarifying what it is 
they want a project to accomplish, showing how their own goals fit with those of other 
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participants, and discovering new, evolving goals as projects proceed. Through such a 
process people come to prioritize their own goals and build commitment to others in a 
project. Finally, the explicit nature of project goals can come to serve as the basis for 
standards for evaluation that allow both project participants and those outside a project 
to decide ways in which it has or has not been successful. 
 Evaluation from this perspective is far different than the alienating process in 
which outsiders use externally derived standards to decide when a project is a success 
or failure. Instead, it is far more interactive and gives project participants ownership of 
(and responsibility for) the criteria of success by which a project will be judged.  
 Agreement among stakeholders, however, is not something that one can 
reasonably expect to be achieved quickly or easily. In fact the importance action 
evaluation places on the role of the Action Evaluator recognizes that questions of what 
constitutes success and possible areas of disagreement are often matters which 
stakeholders seeks to avoid, as they can be sources of discomfort and rancor. The 
Action Evaluator wants to use differences in goals and priorities among goals to foster 
reflection, choice making, and exploration of new alternatives. Through such a process 
conflict resolution projects can be clearer about what is most important and 
stakeholders can develop criteria by which success and failure can be meaningfully 
evaluated. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Support for this research was generously provided by Jay Rothman’s Project on 
Action Evaluation with support from the Pew Charitable Trusts. 
2 My focus here is not on the various evaluation instruments projects have designed or 
on the different methods of outside evaluation that have been used. It is worth 
noting however that often projects design instruments which are viewed by 
funders and others as self-serving when they do little more than garner 
participants’ attitudes towards the intervention, and frequently conveners feel that 
external evaluation is unfair when it imposes evaluation standards on a project 
which are not those the project thought it was working towards. 
3 Internal standards involve direct effects on project participants, while external 
standards are those that concern a project's impact on the larger conflict in which 
it is embedded. For example, a project might have the goal of increasing contact 
and discussion between members of two hostile ethnic communities. This internal 
goal is distinct from the external goal of lowering tension between the two 
communities from which the participants in the project come (Ross and Rothman, 
1999). 
4 Here I do not consider differences between conflict resolution, conflict management, 
and conflict settlement, although I recognize that different theorists and 
practitioners often strongly prefer to use one or another. 
5 By analytic empathy I mean the capacity to understand, but not necessarily 
sympathize with, an opponent's position. 
6 Anthropologists interested in schemas distinguish between folk and social-scientific 
theories in two ways (D’Andrade, 1992). Folk theories are those of local actors in 
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particular situations and are more likely (but not necessarily) to be implicit. In 
contrast, social-scientific theories are the explicit, more general, theories social 
scientists use to explain social action in more than one context. Where by 
definition folk theories utilize actors’ own concepts and frames of reference, 
social-scientific theories are more likely to employ concepts that many actors do 
not recognize or use themselves. This is not surprising since social scientists 
attempt to develop general theories that can be used across contexts and folk 
theories are contextually specific. However what both folk and social-scientific 
theories have in common is that each are generalizations about the world and are 
efforts to make sense of it. The distinction between the two kinds of theories is 
one of degree, not kind, and my concern here is to emphasize that both offer 
guidance for action and that underlying conflict resolution practice are important 
assumptions about why and how certain actions matter. While it is certainly the 
case that many will argue that good practice needs to consider both folk and social 
science theory, here I draw attention to epistemological and methodological 
differences between them that often make it difficult to integrate the two. For a 
discussion of the same two perspectives in conflict resolution, see Lederach's 
(1995: 37-72) discussion of prescriptive and elicitive approaches to training. 
Despite differences in terminology and explicitness both folk and social scientific 
theories are generalizations about the world relevant for understanding action. 
Both folk and social scientific theories can be articulated and help us understand 
what people think can or cannot be done to manage them constructively. 
However, we should also recognize that while both inform action, because they 
are very different forms of knowledge, they can affect behavior in very different 
ways. 
7  Rothman (personal communication) adds while this last point emphasizes action 
evaluation’s role in highlighting and clarifying differences, much of his initial data 
show the presence of different (but not necessarily) incompatible goals, and more 
important, active goal articulation can move a process towards consensus and 
common ground where one did not exist before.  
8 Sometimes, for example, explicit goal setting may overly emphasize cognitive 
processes when the core of a project is to produce changes at the affective level. 
9 Rothman reports that different methods for gathering and evaluating goals are 
currently being compiled in a handbook under preparation. Furthermore, he notes 
that the collection procedures range from formal interviews to more ethnographic 
methods in which participant goals are inferred from statements in meetings and 
their behaviors. 
10 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this article for encouraging me to 
emphasize this important point. 
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Abstract 
 
 The challenges faced by non-governmental organizations seeking to mitigate 
violence within the context of “complex humanitarian emergencies” create new 
dilemmas and require new strategies. These emergencies arise from violence inflicted 
by one group against another within the confines of a state, from the capture of state 
institutions by one group, or by the collapse of these institutions and the failure of 
governance. They develop within a context of disengagement by the major powers and 
the privatization of emergency assistance.  
 I first analyze the dimensions of complex humanitarian emergencies, define the 
dilemmas humanitarian NGOs face and their implications for conflict resolution, and 
examine the changing international context to establish the scope of disengagement and 
privatization. I then assess the troubling evidence that humanitarian NGOs have 
contributed inadvertently to the escalation of violence rather than to conflict resolution. 
I explore three possible strategies, some of them counterintuitive, which could 
contribute to the mitigation of the violence and to conflict resolution. 
 
The Growth of International Non-Government Organizations 
 
 In the examination of the prevention, management, and resolution of violent 
conflict, the role of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) traditionally 
has received little more than a footnote. Analysis of the major powers, regional 
organizations, and the United Nations dominated the discussion. In the last decade, 
however, particularly since the end of the Cold War, non-governmental organizations 
have become more prominent -- and more controversial -- especially in the complex 
humanitarian emergencies that arise from local conflict. They are more important for 
two reasons: the number and importance of NGOs has multiplied exponentially and the 
spectrum of conflict, which is the focus of international attention, has broadened.  
 At least three important changes have occurred in the profile of international non-
governmental organizations. First, there has been a significant increase in the numbers 
of international NGOs working in the south, at the same time as governments in the 
north have privatized their assistance programs (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Gordenker 
and Weiss,1996). The major powers have increased their funding to NGOs even as they 
reduced their spending on bilateral assistance programs. From 1980 to 1993, the 
number of NGOs in the north focused on development almost doubled. This growth is 
a direct outcome of the restructuring of the state and welfare systems by northern 
donors during the 1980s. In some countries, official development assistance has 
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effectively been privatized.  
 International institutions have also vastly increased the proportion of their funding 
that they channel through NGOs. The European Commission, for example, raised its 
funding for NGOs from zero to 40 percent, with a corresponding reduction in bilateral 
emergency aid from 95 to 6 percent between 1976 and 1990. Even in a short period of 
three years, between 1988/89 and 1991/92, the proportion of development assistance 
channeled through NGOs by the Department for International Development (DFID) in 
Britain increased by 28 per cent. The growing importance of NGOs as international 
actors is a function both of the privatization of assistance and the withdrawal of states 
and international organizations from the field. Increasingly, it is NGO personnel who 
are providing relief and assistance to the victims of conflict in the space vacated by 
states and international institutions. This assistance has become embedded, however, in 
the larger context of violent conflict, at times, with unanticipated consequences.  
 Not only have the numbers of NGOs increased, but also new kinds of NGOs have 
developed. A decade ago, it was largely non-governmental organizations with religious 
affiliations that focused on mediation and conflict resolution. Now, secular NGOs, 
specializing in conflict prevention and resolution, and operating independently of states 
and the United Nations, are active in the field. International Alert and the International 
Crisis Group, two of the best known among these new non-governmental 
organizations, have played an especially important role. Although the resources of 
these NGOs who specialize in conflict resolution are minuscule compared to the NGOs 
who provide humanitarian relief, their political impact is often out of proportion to their 
size. Engaged in such activities as negotiating hostage release, supporting local NGOs 
committed to peace building and conflict resolution, advising parties to the conflict, 
and helping to facilitate political negotiations, the conflict resolution NGOs are an 
important part of the international political landscape. At times they complement and at 
times they compete with the traditional diplomatic efforts of the United Nations, 
regional organizations, or individual states. 
 It is not only the newer non-governmental organizations that are committed to 
conflict prevention and resolution. Increasingly, the large, traditional development and 
relief NGOs have adopted components of the conflict resolution agenda in their 
emergency programming. Action Aid, for example, has explicitly designed programs 
for internally displaced persons around principles of reconciliation. This represents a 
significant departure for most of the large NGOs, and one which is likely to represent a 
growing trend in their activity, as political backing and funding for this conflict 
resolution activities increases. Conflict prevention and resolution are now squarely on 
the NGO agenda. 
 The focus of this paper is not on the new NGOs who specialize in conflict 
prevention and  resolution. As important and innovative as they are, it is too early to 
assess their impact systematically (Voutira and Brown, 1995). Rather, I focus on the 
role of the large NGOs, committed to humanitarian assistance and relief, in the context 
of a “complex humanitarian emergency” that grows out of violent conflict.  
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 An examination of the role of the largest relief organizations in complex 
humanitarian emergencies illuminates some of the central dilemmas of conflict 
resolution. These NGOs, with long-standing commitment to a humanitarian ethic, now 
find themselves in the eye of the storm. They are the target of sustained criticism that 
their relief exacerbates and fuels conflict. Examination of this debate goes far beyond 
the role of humanitarian NGOs. It illuminates attributes of violent conflict in the post-
Cold War system, the complexity of contemporary humanitarian emergencies that grow 
out of violent conflict, and, most importantly, the security vacuum which is creating 
these acute dilemmas for NGOs and impeding effective conflict resolution. 
 I define a complex humanitarian emergency as a multi-dimensional humanitarian 
crisis that is created by interlinked political, military, and social factors, most often 
arising from violent internal wars that in turn frequently are the result of state failures. 
It almost always involves some combination of mass population movements, severe 
food insecurity, macro-economic collapse, and acute human rights violations up to and 
including genocidal projects.  
 State failure can refer to a lack of capacity on the part of state institutions to 
secure territory, enforce authority, or maintain a monopoly on coercive violence. The 
state cannot secure the basic rights of citizens, fails to provide fundamental protection, 
and becomes unable to fulfill essential international legal responsibilities. As the 
authority and capacity of the state weakens, it may invite attack from disaffected 
segments of the population who can mobilize the resources. In response, a weakening 
state may attack its own population in an effort to reassert authority, or the state may 
collapse or implode. Collapse is a severe reduction in capacity, authority, security, 
identity, institutions, and, at times, territory, so that institutions effectively cease to 
function. It can be understood as the most severe form of state failure. The Somali 
bombing of sections of northern Somalia is an example of the former, while the flight 
of Siyaad Barre from Somalia is an example of failure through collapse.  
 Alternatively, segments of the population can capture even a relatively strong state 
for parochial purposes and use theinstruments of the state to attack segments of the 
population. The militant Hutu militias, motivated by their strong opposition to a 
negotiated power-sharing agreement, itself the result of a major international effort at 
conflict resolution, captured the state in Rwanda in April 1994 and launched a 
genocidal massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 
 Before examining the theoretical and policy controversies that are swirling around 
the role of NGOs, I briefly describe the cases and the evidence that is used to evaluate 
the competing claims current in the literature. 
 
Evidence and Case Selection 
 
 The study draws on three principal case studies as well as from ongoing tracking 
of other complex humanitarian operations in Africa. Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone are three of the best known cases where political violence led to a large-scale 
humanitarian disaster that required a multi-dimensional response. They are the 
principal case studies (Jones and Stein, 1999; Jones, Stein, and Bryans, 1999). Liberia 
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and Burundi share some of these characteristics, and have been the location of 
important humanitarian programs; Eastern Zaire was the site of multi-faceted response 
to a complex emergency, and the focus of some of the most vociferous debates about 
policy responses. These three cases have been tracked, as important checks on evidence 
drawn from the principal cases.  
 The cases were chosen at different points along the crisis time line: Sierra Leone, 
at the time a case of incipient state failure; Rwanda/Zaire, an on-going crisis; and 
Somalia, a post-emergency, in the aftermath of large-scale intervention. This variation 
in time line permits some consideration of competing theoretical propositions against 
different bodies of evidence. Restriction of the cases to Africa was deliberate. Once the 
Cold War ended, the attention Africa received from the major powers dropped 
precipitously.  As the major powers withdrew, and economic failure and violence 
increased, and, in some cases, states collapsed, development and humanitarian non-
governmental organizations significantly increased their presence.   
 
The Dilemma in Context 
 
 In the last several years, humanitarian NGOs have increasingly found themselves 
trapped in an acute dilemma. This dilemma is best exemplified in the work that was 
done with Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire, in the aftermath of the genocide and the 
victory of the Rwanda Patriotic Front in 1994. Agencies charged with running refugee 
camps, using the most tested and progressive methods of camp management, 
nevertheless found themselves by the autumn employing mass murders and war 
criminals as local staff. The perpetrators of the genocide had re-imposed authority over 
hundreds of thousands of refugees under the supervision of the United Nations and 
humanitarian NGOs, and were organizing to use the camps as a springboard to attack 
the government of Rwanda. Humanitarian assets were being used to fuel rather than 
resolve conflict. A more perverse outcome from the perspective of humanitarian NGOs 
is difficult to imagine. 
 The perversion cannot be explained exclusively or even largely by flawed NGO 
practices. Certainly, practices were flawed at times and could be improved, but, in this 
case, better practices would not have prevented the militias from organizing the camps. 
The roots of the unanticipated and negative consequences of assistance are found, 
paradoxically, first in the humanitarian ethic, which informs the work of many of the 
large NGOs, and then in the attributes of contemporary civil war, the global security 
vacuum, and the changing political economy of international assistance.  
 The humanitarian ethic. Humanitarian work is rooted in a charitable ethic, the 
imperative to come to the assistance of those in dire need. The essence of 
humanitarianism is its neutrality and its universality, its refusal to choose one distress 
over another (Kouchner, 1993; Hendrikson, 1998; Delmas, 1997:201.). Not only those 
NGOs who deliver relief assistance, but those working to facilitate development and 
conflict resolution seek to promote human welfare among distressed populations. 
Humanitarian NGOs believe that intervention to prevent people from dying or starving 
in large numbers is inherently good; equally, it is morally reprehensible to do nothing 
when people are displaced and their lives are at risk. The imperative is to action, to 
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save lives. This categorical imperative creates the political legitimacy for action in 
humanitarian emergencies. 
 Civil wars and complex humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian action is 
occurring, however, in a context very different from the natural earthquakes and 
disasters that are familiar terrain to NGO personnel. Increasingly, NGOs are struggling 
to provide relief and assistance under conditions of civil war, often brutal civil war. In 
the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies characteristic of modern civil wars, human 
populations are the principal targets and shields. They are not the unanticipated 
consequences of military strategy, as they are in major conventional battles, but rather 
the targets of military strategies. The aim of much contemporary military strategy in 
civil wars is make the civilian population hostage, and, if possible, to prevent or undo 
the effects of emergency relief and the protection of civilians.  
 In the internecine struggle for dominance in Somalia and Sierra Leone, and even 
more so in the openly genocidal landscapes of Rwanda and Burundi, strategies of 
insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare sought political control over civilian 
populations, inflicted costs on those populations, at times forced their movements en 
masse and, in some cases, systematically killed large numbers for political or military 
ends. Civilian casualties are not counted as “collateral damage” but as measures of 
strategic gain. In Somalia and Sierra Leone, militias and army units alike looted 
communities, destroyed available resources, engaged in scorched earth tactics against 
the local infrastructure, and attacked civilian populations. All over Central Africa in the 
1990s, insurgency campaigns were fought behind the shields of population groups.   
 The human costs the non-governmental agencies address are not incidental to the 
conflict; rather, they are its essential currency. Civilians, and those humanitarian NGOs 
who would protect them, become the objects of military action. They and their 
resources stand not apart from, but directly on the battlefield. Becoming part of the 
battle challenges all the fundamental precepts of humanitarian action. 
 Disengagement by the major powers and the consequent security vacuum. This 
NGO dilemma of engagement is made far more acute by the repeated unwillingness or 
incapacity of the major powers to act through the UN Security Council or other 
appropriate instruments, to provide security first for endangered civilians and then for 
NGO personnel who are in the field offering protection. Somalia was the exception at 
one stage of its emergency, but so negative were the experiences of the UN and 
particularly the US “military humanitarian” mission in Somalia, and so limited the 
strategic goals in comparison to the apparent costs, that Somalia set a “Mogadishu line” 
of active engagement which the US and other Western forces were thereafter unwilling 
to cross in the African context. The non-governmental sector found itself working in a 
political/security vacuum created by the decline of interest on the part of the major 
powers.  It is the absence of an adequate security envelope, I will argue, which creates 
many of the observed negative externalities of assistance and relief, and retards the 
prospects of conflict resolution. 
 Even less demanding levels of support are dropping. The substantial increase in 
what the humanitarian community calls the “internally displaced” is telling: In 1991, 
UNHCR was responsible for 17 million refugees; by 1995, numbers had risen to 27.4 
million. This increase, moreover, masks a qualitative change: the number of refugees 
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who cross international borders and are granted asylum in another state has been 
declining in the last decade. The increase in UNHCR numbers are internally displaced 
and war-affected populations within their home countries and people outside their 
home countries who have not been granted asylum (UNHCR, 1995:20; Duffield, 1998: 
143). The increase reflects an increasing inability for populations in distress to seek 
asylum across borders and become officially recognized refugees with access to the 
political and humanitarian rights of refugees. The growth in the numbers of internally 
displaced person reflects the growing tendency for the international community to 
disengage politically and economically from these conflicts, to attempt to contain their 
effects, and to ensure that the costs are internalized within the affected communities. 
This strategy of containment privileges relief at the expense of the protection of the 
basic rights of displaced populations (Duffield, 1998).  
 The political economy of international assistance. As the major powers become 
more unwilling to engage directly or through the United Nations, they are channeling 
ever larger shares of their assistance to Africa through NGOs.  In 1996, more aid to 
Africa was channeled through NGOs than through official development assistance 
programs. Of course, Western government aid agencies are still the principal source of 
those resources, but in complex emergencies in particular, NGOs are increasingly the 
principal conduit of assistance and so face an ever larger share of the dilemmas 
humanitarianism generates in complex emergencies. The major powers expect -- 
unrealistically -- that the community of NGOs can fill the security vacuum left by 
inaction on the part of states (Lautze, Jones, and Duffield, 1998). 
 In this context, NGOs have become a critical resource. For several of the worst 
months of the Somali famine in 1991, for example, a handful of NGOs and the ICRC 
were the only international presence in the country providing relief and assistance. In 
Sierra Leone, NGOs provided relief in parts of the country declared off limits by the 
UN. In Rwanda/Zaire, the flood of refugees in the autumn of 1994  was met by NGOs, 
working without an official UN presence. In Burundi, where military activity kept the 
UN out of important regions of the country, NGOs were again at the front-line in the 
delivery of humanitarian relief assistance.  
 The root causes of the complex emergencies grow from the interlinked failures of 
development and the weaknesses of the state and the withering of its capacity, or the 
capture of the state apparatus by organized fragments of the population. In the violence 
that develops, social control over elements of the population is a key strategic objective 
of internal war, with civilians as a principal target, rather than a by-product of other 
military activity. Many of these internal wars fought for control over resources become 
cyclical and self-perpetuating, as violence generates profit for those who use it most 
effectively -- which often means most brutally.  
 This interaction among a humanitarian ethic with an imperative to action, the 
withdrawal of major powers and international institutions from Africa, the ferocity of 
civil wars and the complexity of the humanitarian emergencies they create, and the new 
political economy of international assistance together generate acute contradictions for 
humanitarian NGOs on the front lines of conflict. Analysis of these contradictions 
demonstrates the fissures in the structure of international security and the challenges to 
conflict prevention and resolution. 
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The Critics:  Humanitarianism as an Obstacle to Conflict Resolution. 
 
 Drawing on the experience of humanitarian intervention in complex emergencies 
in Africa in the last several years, critics have concluded that the relief effort at best 
does not contribute to, and at worst, can jeopardize conflict resolution.  At least seven 
threads of criticism can be identified; some speak to the central dilemma of 
humanitarian NGOs that I have identified, while others are tangential. I begin with the 
most technical -- and least serious -- and progress to the most trenchant and troubling. 
 1. Humanitarian NGOs are often inefficient and unprofessional. There is a 
significant body of critics of the operations and accountability of NGOs. The multi-
donor evaluation of the Rwandan crisis could not, for example, locate a third of the 170 
NGOs registered, and some $120 million of funding went unaccounted for (World 
Disasters Report, 1997: 12). The issue of accountability, which includes not only 
finance but adequate independent monitoring of performance and program evaluation, 
grows out of the rapid proliferation of NGOs as states began to privatize their 
assistance policies. The problem is serious but essentially technical. There has been 
reluctance by some NGOs to submit to independent evaluation, largely because 
independent assessments can uncover major failures (Prendergast, 1995). In the last 
few years, however, greater emphasis has been put on developing best practices and on 
monitoring of programs and performance. Especially in the context of a complex 
emergency, monitoring that is oriented toward support of internal evaluation and 
development is more likely to be acceptable and effective than external audit. 
 Evaluations have also stressed the need for better coordination among NGOs, 
better coordination among donor governments and between donors and NGOs, more 
responsible and restrained use of the news media by NGOs, and stronger coordination 
by a lead agency within the United Nations when a complex emergency erupts 
(Bennett, 1996; Minear, Scott, and Weiss, 1996; Lautze, Jones, and Duffield, 1998). In 
Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire in 1994, it is estimated that as many as 80,000 people 
may have died due to poor standards of health provision (Borton, Brussett and Hallam, 
1996). In Somalia, it is estimated that as many as 240,000 lives were lost due to 
delayed action by the international community. Furthermore, while the international 
response focused on food aid, perhaps 70 percent of deaths could have been averted 
through public health programs (Sommer, 1994: 97).  
 NGOs have recognized the need for greater coordination amongst themselves and 
with donors and international institutions and have taken several steps to establish 
coordinating mechanisms. In Rwanda, for example, the NGOs established a 
Coordinating Committee in 1995, partly as a result of the large numbers of NGOs 
working in Rwanda and partly because of the tense relationship with the new 
government. The Coordinating Committee evaluated the broad range of  NGO 
programming in collaboration with the government and established an executive 
committee that met regularly to discuss issues of joint concern. In Burundi, the NGOs 
established their own forum for coordination. NGOs met regularly with heads of UN 
agencies to discuss joint problems and share information and, in Rwanda, were 
regularly represented at UN security meetings.  
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 Voice. It is almost universally acknowledged that NGOs need deeper knowledge 
of the society, its culture, history, and language. In Somalia and Rwanda, for example, 
few NGOs had long-standing experience in the country, were fluent in the local 
language, appreciated social and cultural norms, and were experienced in working at 
the grass roots (Shiras, 1996). Of the large number of expatriate NGO staff in Rwanda 
in 1994, only a handful were conversant in Kinyarwanda. Knowledge of local parties, 
their networks, their purposes and strategies is critical, I will argue, to minimizing some 
of the negative consequences of relief assistance which fuel rather than resolve conflict. 
In addition to their loyalty, as expressed through humanitarian ethics, NGOs must find 
far better ways of giving voice to the people they wish to help. 
 Finally, humanitarians need better skills in conflict resolution. In Somalia, 
traditional systems of authority, which did not depend on violence, and were capable of 
attempting the resolution of the conflict, continued to exist even after the violence 
erupted. A peace- building initiative sponsored by an NGO at the local level was 
successful because it drew upon these customary Somali conflict management practices 
(Menkhaus, 1997). The relief effort, in contrast, helped to cripple the traditional 
systems because it did not channel assistance through them but strengthened those that 
relied on violence (Natsios, 1997: 85-86). NGO personnel needed far greater 
knowledge of the local systems of conflict management and the importance of elders as 
authoritative voices in society. 
 2. Humanitarian assistance from outside interferes with the accountability of 
African leaders to their populations. It reduces warring parties’ responsibility for their 
constituencies. This criticism is an expanded, generic version of the previous argument 
about technical accountability and competence. Critics allege that political 
accountability, through contractual arrangements, are the critical constraint on 
government violence against civilians and on government-induced famine. Thirty party 
humanitarian assistance interferes with the formation of social and political contracts 
within Africa.  
 This criticism has been leveled most tellingly in the context of the analysis of 
famines. It is not natural disasters or economic collapse that create starvation and mass 
migration; alone, they are insufficient. Rather, famine is the result of systematic 
violence, deployed for political purposes, and designed to destroy the coping 
mechanisms and survival strategies of peasants (Sen, 1981; De Mars, 1996). Two 
issues arise from this analysis of the political economy of famine in a context of 
violence (Duffield, 1991; Keen, 1994).  
 First, the argument has been made that relief assistance does not address the 
causes of famine, and may indeed exacerbate its severity, by making political leaders 
less accountable to their constituencies (de Waal, 1989). When assistance is distributed 
in rural areas, governments in central areas are able to avoid the political responsibility 
incumbent on any government, to feed their own populations (Prendergast, 1996,1997). 
In Sudan, for example, relief made the authorities less accountable to their civilian 
populations.  
 Critics find it easier to diagnose the politically motivated violence of famine than 
to suggest strategies that can alleviate the hunger that is its consequence. They suggest 
that rural areas must be empowered politically so that they can forge ties with a center 
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that becomes accountable (de Waal, 1989). Logically elegant, such a strategy ignores 
the context of acute insecurity created by the predatory violence that is so critical to the 
diagnosis.  
 Analysis of the political and economic purposes of those who prey on their own 
civilian population does not suggest that the perpetrators are likely candidates for 
accountable governments. The authoritarian quality of many governments, the absence 
of institutions that can meaningfully hold leaders accountable, and the high levels of 
corruption make contractual constraints unlikely as a near-term solution to complex 
emergencies and violent conflict. Acknowledging these obstacles, the optimistic 
analysts estimate that it will take at least a decade for political contracts to form; others 
are even more pessimistic (Duffield, 1997). These pessimistic estimates suggest that at 
best, empowerment and accountability will be painfully slow processes that are 
unlikely to proceed in smooth, linear patterns. Political contracts cannot provide a near-
term solution to violent conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Until they do, if they 
do, the complex emergency continues and the third party and the local humanitarian 
dilemmas intensify. Yet, humanitarians must contribute to the seeding of this 
accountability if the vulnerable populations they seek to help are ever to be given 
voice. 
 3. Humanitarian aid is a substitute for international political action. There is a 
growing international indifference to humanitarian crises. Governments have privatized 
their assistance policies and adopted strategies of containment rather than address the 
underlying causes of complex humanitarian emergencies. They are increasingly 
resistant to accepting refugees and unwilling to grant asylum as mandated by the 
international refugee regime, even as they are less inclined to intervene politically or 
militarily to protect populations at risk. There is a corresponding decline in the public's 
response to the appeals of NGOs for funds. It is in this context that NGOs are being 
substituted for effective action by the major powers and exploited as a cover for their 
absence (Hendrickson, 1998). 
 Humanitarian relief has also been compromised by the unsustainable and 
conditional consent it has accepted to access populations at risk. NGOs have 
experienced enormous difficulty in gaining access to vulnerable populations. These 
difficulties are deliberately created by warring parties who, in the context of a complex 
humanitarian emergency, exploit the vulnerability of civilian populations for political 
or military purposes. NGOs find themselves constantly renegotiating access and facing 
new designations of previously consented space as off limits. The warring parties in 
turn frequently use negotiated access agreements to build international credibility. At 
the extreme, this leads to the perverse outcome that the more killing is done, the more 
NGOs respond with additional resources. With no good choices, NGOs consent tacitly 
to unilateral changes in access and so empower belligerents who impose conditions that 
clearly violate international humanitarian law.  
 4. Relief has negative consequences for development. Critics of classical 
humanitarian relief alleged that it had negative consequences for development, that it 
removed initiative and responsibility from local parties, empowered expatriates rather 
than community leaders, and undermined the local economy (de Waal, 1989). In 
response to these criticisms, some NGOs have shifted their emphasis to a new 
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paradigm of  “developmentalist” models of relief, usually called the “relief-to-
development-and-democracy (RDD) continuum.” To avoid creating a culture of 
dependency and to move a population toward peace as quickly as possible, relief and 
development should and can occur simultaneously, even while violence is ongoing 
(Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). 
 “Developmentalist” strategies posit a quick end to the complex emergency and a 
return to stability where peaceful development is possible. The fundamental elements 
of the strategy are local partnerships based on capacity building and the empowerment 
of local communities as the choosers and managers of development policies. The 
purpose is to create alternative livelihoods for those associated with war and a 
criminalized economy. The approach is multi-functional and loosely structured and, on 
the continuum, the boundary between relief and development blurs and, indeed, 
virtually disappears (Duffield, 1996; Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994). 
 The concepts of local partnerships and community empowerment are key 
elements of a successful strategy of development, and of a process of conflict 
resolution that moves forward at a sustainable pace over time. Vulnerable communities 
must be given voice if  predators are to be constrained in any way and a sustainable 
process of conflict resolution is to begin. Ironically, however, the emphasis on more 
“participatory” emergency relief led more or less directly to the non-governmental 
sector’s greatest crisis of conscience and credibility. In Eastern Zaire where aid 
agencies were setting up camps for the influx of thousands from Rwanda, they 
employed the latest techniques of camp management involving, among other things 
“refugee self-management.” The goal is to use indigenous leadership within refugee 
populations to help them, as much as possible, run their own affairs. In this case, 
however, the leadership cadres were precisely those who had engineered the genocide 
and then the forced mass migration. The resulting dilemma stretched over many 
months, with no obvious solution.  
 This new “developmentalist” model also ignores, indeed virtually wishes away, 
the scope of the violence and the extent of the emergency that make an early return to 
stability extremely unlikely. In some cases -- the Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia -- the 
emergency has continued for a decade or more. In other cases -- Rwanda and Sudan --  
the premature declaration of an end to the emergency to fit with the new agenda is 
belied by the continuing, indeed, escalating violence within the country.   
 In Rwanda, the governing expectation for planning in 1996 was gradual but 
progressive rehabilitation and development. There were positive trends: the return of 
the refugees, the restoration of some basic government services, and limited economic 
improvement. By December 1997, however, 50% of Rwanda was again considered 
“insecure,” and the number of internally displaced was increasing rather than 
diminishing (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998). The emergency had not ended, it had ebbed 
briefly before intensifying again. The expectation of stability proved wildly unrealistic 
in the context of intensifying violence. Similarly, in Sudan, despite ongoing hostilities, 
an end to the emergency was declared. The government subsequently permitted NGOs 
to register only for development and rehabilitation, despite the growing numbers of 
people in desperate need of emergency relief (Lautze and Hammock, 1996: 27). The 
premature end to the emergency served the political purposes of a regime that was 
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oppressing vulnerable populations.  
 The relief-to-development-to-democracy approach also creates pressure to 
reclassify emergencies so that the multi-functional approach can begin to work. 
Premature re-labeling has led to the normalizing of emergencies and the raising of 
thresholds of civilian violence before an emergency can be declared (Duffield, 1998). 
More generically, developmentalist approaches to relief seriously underestimate the 
difficulty of implementing development programs in the context of the acute violence 
and extreme insecurity that are characteristic of protracted humanitarian emergencies. 
They do so in part because they ignore the politics of those who benefit from the 
prolonged emergency. 
 Finally, there is little systematic evidence to sustain the argument that relief 
generally displaces development and creates dependency (Carlsson, Koehlin, and 
Ekbom, 194:203). It may well do so under certain conditions, but we do not know 
enough to differentiate the conditions under which relief does block development. 
Given the limited amount of relief that is provided and the relatively short duration of 
most, though not all, large relief operations, it seems unlikely that relief would appear 
an attractive option in comparison to alternative coping strategies usually available to 
subsistence populations. It is more likely that acute violence disrupts these coping 
strategies and vulnerable populations have no choice but relief assistance. We need to 
investigate rather than assert the relationship between relief and development. 
 5. Humanitarian aid emphasizes reconstruction at the expense of justice. Even 
when there is attention to reconstruction, it is largely focused on restoring services and 
rebuilding economies, not on the political accountability that is central to a reformed 
political system. Humanitarian relief, in part because of its commitment to impartiality 
and neutrality, avoids dealing with the political ambitions and past actions of predators 
(Duffield, 1998; Keen, 1994, 1996). This criticism of NGOs who deliver relief 
assistance, which is apt on its terms, applies equally, however, to the development and 
conflict resolution NGOs when they work in complex humanitarian emergencies. 
Reconstruction of any kind assumes a benign rather than a predator state or militia who 
systematically targets civilian populations for economic or political ends. Yet, often it 
is precisely those who created the massive disruption originally who are subsequently 
invited to participate, first in reconstruction, then in development, and, finally, in 
conflict resolution. All three can compromise the pursuit of justice. 
 6. Humanitarian relief fuels war and conflict through asset transfer. The evidence 
is overwhelming that, in recent complex humanitarian emergencies, the assistance and 
relief that NGOs have provided to populations deliberately put at risk, have, at the same 
time, become the fuel for continued and renewed warfare (Duffield, 1993). In Somalia, 
for example, food was extraordinarily scarce as a result of drought and civil conflict 
and, consequently, its absolute value rose to unprecedented levels. Its high price, in the 
context of economic collapse, mass unemployment, and a dramatic drop in family 
income, increased the relative value of food. Food brought into Somalia through the 
relief effort was plundered by merchants, by organized gangs of young men 
profiteering from the black market, and by militia leaders who used the wealth the food 
bought to buy weapons and the loyalty of followers (Natsios, 1997). In Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, as well as in Somalia, assistance has been “taxed,” or stolen to fuel 
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processes of conflict escalation rather than promote conflict resolution.  
 Resources channeled into Somalia by UN agencies and NGOs became part of a 
complex economy of warfare between rival militias and rival clans. Theft of those 
resources by militias was common. Equally significant was the ability of militias, in the 
absence of a security envelope for the local population and for NGO personnel, to use 
force and the threat of force to compel NGOs to hire some of the same forces to guard 
relief supplies and convoys who were the source of the humanitarian crisis (Clarke and 
Herbst, 1997: Prendergast, 1997). In so doing, NGOs legitimated those who were 
preying on local populations (Anderson, 1996). In Sierra Leone and Liberia, conflict 
analysts and medical NGOs learned that they could plan by following the pattern of UN 
food deliveries: when food was distributed to a village or displaced persons camp, the 
militias would quickly attack to steal the relief supplies, killing dozens of villagers as 
they did so.  
 UN and NGO resources in eastern Zaire were subject to political control and 
taxation by the forces that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Less by theft 
and diversion than by controlling distribution of relief supplies and the flow of 
information, Rwanda’s genocidaires turned UN-managed and NGO-operated refugee 
camps into political and resource bases for continued and renewed genocidal warfare, 
both within Zaire and in western Rwanda (Duffield, 1994). When the post-1994 
Rwandan regime sought to break the genocidaires’ control of the camps, civilian 
refugees became moving shields between two armies. Relief supplies and the NGO 
presence were used to lure starving refugees out of hiding in the forests of Zaire, and 
these refugees were then slaughtered by the tens of thousands. At the extreme, NGOs 
were transformed from sources of protection into resources for destruction.  
 The diversion of humanitarian assets by warring parties, at the same time as they 
are targeting warring parties, is the most serious challenge NGOs face. It is the most 
dramatic example of the perversion of the humanitarian agenda and it is a serious 
obstacle to the resolution of conflict.  To the extent that humanitarian NGOs are 
inadvertently fueling the cycle of violence which is making populations vulnerable, 
they and those that they seek to help are trapped in a vicious process. Yet to abandon 
populations at risk to the predators is an almost unthinkable choice. 
 Critics disagree radically on the appropriate solutions. Some urge that relief 
assistance be radically restructured or even eliminated. There is agreement among the 
radical critics that conflict can be resolved only through a long process of creating a 
vibrant civil society that can demand good governance, but there is considerable 
difference about how civil society can best be promoted. Some urge the virtual 
exclusion of third party humanitarians, so that governments and populations have no 
alternative but to create contracts, while, at the other extreme, some urge a high level of 
partnering between “progressive” northern and southern NGOs, to force governments 
to be accountable (Prendergast, 1996). Aid would be made conditional on good 
governance and respect for human rights. 
 I have already examined the real and serious obstacles to the development of 
binding contractual relationships as a near-term solution to violence. In the fragmented 
politics of those marginalized by the global economy, some claim that even 
evolutionary processes toward political accountability are delusional (Duffield, 1997). 
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Since society is fragmented, politicized, and incorporated into black or gray predatory 
economies, the model of a civil society separate from a centralized state does not fit; 
there simply is no civil society to strengthen. One pessimistic analyst of post-modern 
violence concludes that “War and famine do not stand out from normal social relations; 
they are simply a deepening of exploitative processes”(Keen, 1994:12). The same kind 
of contextual challenges would confront those northern NGOs who partnered with their 
southern counterparts in order to force local militias and predators to be accountable 
(Fowler, 1998). 
 The larger critique -- that relief fuels war -- is valid and important, but it does not 
develop either criticism or solution within an appropriate context. Withdrawal of the 
humanitarian presence, I argue, should be only the last in a staged series of options, and 
even then, it has negative consequences because those that are watching and reporting 
to the outside world will no longer be there, even as a mild deterrent. It is also 
important to note that not only relief but many other economic activities fuel and 
sustain war as well. The importance of relief is likely to vary by context: in eastern 
Zaire, relief assistance was a critical resource to militia leaders, while, in other cases, 
the drug trade and smuggling were far more important generators of resources to 
predators. No study systematically investigates the proportionality of effects on war, 
yet only careful empirical analysis can resolve the question of the proportional impact 
of humanitarian aid on war. 
 
Minimizing the Negative Consequences of Aid in War 
 
 There are no easy or obvious solutions to the fundamental dilemmas humanitarian 
NGOs face as they seek both to help populations preyed upon by governments or 
militias, and to help resolve the conflict so that vulnerable populations will no longer 
be targets of systematic violence. Indeed, analysis of the structure and context of 
complex humanitarian emergencies offers little grounds for optimism about a quick end 
to violence. Accumulated experience in attempting to manage these emergencies and 
resolve the internal conflicts of the last decade is no more encouraging. For 
humanitarians, the dilemmas are likely to persist and intensify. We need look no further 
than the recent experience in Kosovo in August 1998, where civilian populations were 
yet again systematically targeted, humanitarians were again denied access even after 
consent was given, and hunger was deliberately created by the burning of crops and the 
destruction of farming implements.  
 Two conclusions are clear from the analysis. First, complex humanitarian 
emergencies of the kind we have seen in this last decade in Africa are likely to continue 
and not only in Africa, well into the future. Second, NGOs committed to humanitarian 
values will continue to engage on behalf of vulnerable populations. Disengagement is 
not an option for humanitarian NGOs, even if it is for states. If anything, given the 
privatization of assistance and the retreat of the United Nations hobbled by budget 
deficits, NGOs will play an even larger role than they have in the past (Carnegie 
Commission, 1997: 105-127).The central challenge, then, from the perspective of 
conflict resolution, is to find ways of minimizing the negative externalities of 
assistance as aid flows to the most vulnerable populations. NGOs are looking for ways 
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to prevent the transfer of assets to the warring parties, so that their work does not fuel 
the cycle of war. It is vital that humanitarians learn from past experience, and that they 
constantly evaluate their practices to assess whether alternatives exists which would 
minimize the negative consequences of their work in the context of a complex 
humanitarian emergency. In the last five years, there has been considerable progress in 
exploring alternative ways of reducing these negative externalities. I consider only a 
few of a large number of proposals and programs that have been put in place in the last 
several years. 
 Paying explicit attention to the diversion of food aid to warring parties, NGOs 
have begun to distinguish types of food aid by their market value. They ask how 
“lootable” their assistance is.  In Somalia, for example, rice was extraordinarily 
attractive to looters while sorghum evoked little interest. When, for example, a food 
convoy organized by CARE was attacked along the Jubba River in Somalia, the thieves 
left without stealing when they discovered that the trucks contained sorghum (Natsios, 
1997:87). Blended foods, generally less tasty, are less attractive, and foods that can be 
stored for extended periods of time can be hidden from predators. The ICRC, for 
example, moved to cooked food to reduce the interest of looters. Careful monitoring, 
important on its own as NGOs seek to become transparent and accountable, was 
remarkably successful in Rwanda and Angola in reducing diversion. Similarly, seeds 
can be selected so that they are less attractive to looters: those that are easily stored, 
that match local habits of consumption, and that displaced populations can take with 
them as they move to different locales are less likely to be diverted.  
 In Somalia, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), a department of 
USAID,  tried an innovative strategy of  “monetizing” the food that was delivered. 
Insofar as food had become a medium of exchange, flooding the country with food 
would depreciate its attractiveness and diminish the incentive for looting (Natsios, 
1997: 86-93). Selling cereals as well as cooking oil to merchants would permit people 
to buy food with their limited incomes as the price of food declined. The monetization 
strategy was also designed to force onto the markets all the food hoarded by organized 
criminals and warlords. Monetization did affect market prices by 1993 and produced 
enough currency to fund significant rehabilitation and reconstruction. It did not 
succeed, however, in reducing diversion; the drop in food prices drove the warlords to 
“tax” at higher levels. Only after the military intervention, did monetization accelerate 
and break the hold of the warlords.  
 NGOs are also trying to increase the ratio of non-food to food aid within the 
constraints imposed by a complex emergency. There is much greater emphasis on 
supporting sustainable livelihoods - distribution of fishing nets where fish are available, 
vaccination programs against measles, a perennial killer of children in complex 
emergencies, and portable educational materials so that schools can continue even as 
populations are forced to move. None of these are easily “lootable” material that can 
fuel a war economy. 
 NGOs have also recognized how the economic side-effects of their operations can 
contribute to a war economy. Collaboration among NGOs, difficult as it is, to 
standardize physical costs can drastically reduce the negative externalities of 
assistance. In Baidoa, for example, all agencies collaborated to reduce the costs of 
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vehicles. In Rwanda, Save the Children (UK) organized some NGOs to standardize 
prices of housing and transport. In Goma, UNHCR and the NGOs cooperated to put a 
ceiling on labor costs; salaries were immediately reduced by 50% (Prendergast, 
1995:20).  
 Proposals have also been developed to share information, to coordinate and plan 
better, to improve institutional memory, and increase area expertise so that NGO 
personnel can learn quickly about local politics and structures. Since the genocide and 
mass exodus from Rwanda in 1994, some NGOs have consciously begun to develop 
their capacity to collect information about and analyze political and security 
developments that might have an important impact on diversion of aid and, more 
generally, on operations. MSF has an ongoing global country watch; Action Aid has 
created an office called Emergency Response and Information Collection (ERIC) for 
the Great Lakes Region; and many NGOs feed into and from the UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs’ Integrated Regional Information Network for the Great Lakes 
and for West Africa. UNICEF has created a global Rapid Response Team and CARE is 
examining how it can preposition experienced staff in areas where populations seem 
particularly at risk (Prendergast, 1995). NGOs recognize that they need good 
operational knowledge of differentiation along identity and class lines if they are to 
succeed in minimizing the diversion of aid to warring parties. 
 In response to criticism that they have violated humanitarian space, NGOs have 
worked together to define more carefully the responsibilities of emergency aid and to 
refine the ethics of humanitarian action. International humanitarian agencies have 
adopted standards of performance and codes of conduct: the Code of Conduct for the 
International Red Cross Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief; the elaboration of a 
set of technical standards in the field of water and food aid delivery by the Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR); the development of principles and 
best practices for the recruitment and management of relief workers by People in Aid in 
the United Kingdom; and the development by the SCHR of a “claimants” charter 
defining beneficiary rights.  
 NGOs have also worked to improved their assessment of needs within a broader 
model which includes black as well as official economies, an analysis of the local 
coping strategies of populations at risk, and an assessment of their capacities as well as 
their needs. A broader analytic lens helps NGOs to focus on supporting herds, or 
replacing implements, so that vulnerable populations can survive in the face of 
predators. In Somalia, for example, NGOs have begun only recently to assess local 
coping mechanisms and capacities. NGOs are looking at emergency assistance that 
simultaneously supports and sustains local community structures. Here too, they are 
monitoring to ascertain whether aid is reaching the intended targets. Meeting local 
needs and at the same time sustaining community structures and building capacity is a 
long term, trial-and-error process as NGO personnel learn local structures on the 
ground. When they can do so, the distinction between relief and development begins to 
blur. 
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A Political Humanitarianism 
 
 These strategies, alone or together, can reduce the scope and severity but never 
completely eliminate the transfer of assets to warriors and other negative externalities 
of aid. Analysis of these cases suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more 
chaotic the security markets, and the more traumatized the social order, the more 
important an adequate security envelope for effective delivery of humanitarian 
assistance (Natsios, 1997:93). For  humanitarians working in complex emergencies, 
acute dilemmas will occur as long as the United Nations is unable to provide security 
as a public good and the major powers continue to disengage and privatize assistance as 
a substitute for political action. There is no evidence that either trend is likely to change 
in the near future; on the contrary, both are likely to intensify. If they do, the range of 
choices for humanitarian NGOs will frequently be narrow, and, at the extreme, there 
will be no “good” choices to be made.  
In the camps in eastern Zaire in 1994 and 1995, for example, there was 
considerable resource transfer, misappropriation, taxation and theft by militias. Here, 
the genocidaires unquestionably drew their main political support from the physical 
presence of the humanitarian effort; the humanitarian presence provided an economic 
base from which they and most important, their key strategic resource -- Rwandan 
civilians -- could live. The critical and agonizing issue for NGOs was whether to stay 
and fuel the capacity of the genocidaires to make war, or leave and abandon the 
civilian population that the militia had targeted and exploited. The choice was cruel and 
stark, a political and ethical dilemma beyond the reach of any technical solution 
available then or now.  NGO personnel may not be able to choose to do no harm, if by 
doing nothing, they abandon civilian populations at risk and violate their humanitarian 
ethics (Anderson,1996). In the face of those who are determined to do harm to 
civilians, NGOs may well be forced to choose the option that does the least harm. In an 
effort to reduce reliance upon militias, for example, NGOs have experimented with 
market-based and commercial channels in Somalia.  This approach does reduce 
diversion as well as the number of armed security men employed by agencies, but it 
can empower merchants who finance the warlords (Prendergast, 1995:9). To make the 
choice that does the least harm, humanitarian NGOs must situate their work in its larger 
political context. 
Humanitarians must acknowledge and analyze the explicitly political nature of 
their work -- relief delivery, refugee protection, election monitoring, and conflict 
resolution -- in the context of a complex emergency. NGOs traditionally have argued 
and still argue that only strict adherence to principles of neutrality and consent of the 
parties can insulate relief assistance from political and military agendas (Keen and 
Wilson, 1994). Neutrality, it is argued, contributes to the amelioration of violence and 
conflict resolution by effectively inducing UN agencies and governments to provide 
assistance, by deterring violence by their presence on the ground and their access to the 
media, and by their capacity to mediate among the warring parties (Berry, 1997). I, and 
others, allege that the context of relief assistance has changed so radically that 
apolitical neutrality is no longer an option. Neutrality is appropriate in a neutral 
environment, but the environments of complex emergencies are generally predatory 
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rather than neutral. If the political purposes of those who target civilian populations are 
ignored, NGOs will miss the inherently political nature of the relief they deliver to 
those targeted populations and miscalculate the politics of protecting those they seek to 
help. 
NGOs should urge the Secretary General to provide security from private markets 
when public security for humanitarian operations is unavailable. This analysis 
suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more chaotic the security markets. Yet, 
the more traumatized the social order, the more important an adequate security envelop 
for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance (Natsios, 1997:93). Complex 
emergencies feed on themselves, enfeebling and even wiping away legitimate security 
resources, spreading chaos and violence, and generating the need for even greater 
security resources from outside. The cycle can only be broken if security is again 
supplied as a public good, ideally by the major powers acting through international 
institutions, or by members of regional organizations acting collectively. This analysis 
suggests, however, that the prospects of repairing the shredded security envelope in 
which humanitarian NGOs currently operate are not promising. 
The major powers that are critical to authorization of a UN force are likely to 
consider most of the humanitarian emergencies as "discretionary" and, consequently, 
be unwilling to commit forces, directly or through the United Nations, to a crisis that 
humanitarians consider urgent. The falling budget for UN peacekeeping speaks loudly. 
Given the demographic and social forces that reinforce the aversion to casualties in 
post-industrial states, this caution can only become more pronounced over time. The 
"Mogadishu line" has become, at the close of the decade, a military and political 
firebreak that, other than in exceptional circumstances, major powers outside the region 
seem increasingly unwilling to cross. 
The Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, 
observing the general lack of willingness of members of the United Nations to provide 
security forces for humanitarian operations, noted that states are not at all "averse to 
letting humanitarian staff go where they dare not send their...invariably better 
equipped, better trained and better protected [troops]."  He proposed the creation of 
"regional humanitarian security teams" trained and equipped to support humanitarian 
personnel at short notice; teams would be drawn from "selected troops from a variety 
of nations in the region concerned" (DHA News, 1997: 5, 7-8). This proposal is 
consistent with the so-called "regional" or "sub-regional" approach to conflict 
resolution, where the responsibility for peacekeeping and security rests with the 
countries closest to the problem. In the wake of the terrible failure first to prevent and 
then to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the United States, Britain, and France supported 
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a project to help train and equip a 
standby, rapid reaction peacekeeping force; this has yet to be put to the test. By far the 
most extensive trial of regional peacekeeping has been the eight-year long deployment 
of a multi-national force or "monitoring group" (ECOMOG) first in Liberia and more 
recently in Sierra Leone, by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). The record of ECOMOG has been mixed, but no more so than UN and 
NATO forces deployed elsewhere (Smith and Weiss, 1997; Griffen, 1999; Rowe, 1998; 
Scott. Minear, and Weiss, 1995). 
 Humanitarian NGOs 34
 
 
African peacekeeping and peace-enforcing efforts have been effective in 
providing a security envelope where they have been deployed, but the overall pattern is 
nevertheless not encouraging. Forces have been infrequently deployed and the choices 
as to where and when to intervene have been essentially arbitrary. There is also 
growing concern at the United Nations about compliance with international standards 
in regional operations that the UN authorizes. The Secretary-General recently urged the 
Security Council to confirm that regional organizations have the capacity to carry out 
operations consistent with international norms and standards, and to put in place 
mechanisms to monitor regional peacekeeping forces operating under the authority of 
the UN (Secretary-General, 1999). 
When security is scarce as a public good, the security of NGO personnel in the 
field is, as I have noted, not surprisingly increasingly at risk. There are, however, very 
limited arrangements currently in place through the United Nations to promote their 
security, even when they are contracted to the UN. Within the UN, the United Nations 
Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) coordinates, plans, and implements safety 
programs and acts as the nexus for interagency cooperation on security issues, 
exclusive of peacekeeping forces. These arrangements are restricted to personnel 
engaged in operations specifically authorized by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly (Secretary-General, 1999: 10). In a memorandum of understanding 
circulated in early 1997, NGOs who are implementing partners of agencies within the 
UN may request to be included in UN security arrangements; to do so, they must agree 
to pay their share of the costs and abide by UN security guidelines. These arrangements 
are restricted to expatriate staff of NGOs that are implementing partners and to those 
employees directly engaged in fulfilling the contract; they do not include local staff, or 
even all expatriate staff, much less extend to vulnerable populations. It is not surprising 
that NGOs objected to the loss of autonomy, the inequities, and the cost. Here donors 
could be helpful: they could emphasize as a priority and fund security costs as part of 
their envelopes for humanitarian assistance and they could also press for a long 
overdue review of the role of UNSECOORD. Even were more inclusive agreements to 
be negotiated with the United Nations, they would not address the fundamental 
challenge of the deep insecurity of the vulnerable populations humanitarians seek to 
help. 
When security is not being provided as a public good, as it frequently is not in a 
complex humanitarian emergency, NGOs should reluctantly consider urging the 
Secretary General to draw on private resources to provide security.  The absence of 
international public security forces, and the lack of effective and legitimate alternatives, 
empowered the militias of Somalia, Eastern Zaire, Sierra Leone and Liberia to terrible 
effect. It is only when security is absent that humanitarian assistance prolongs rather 
than mitigates violence. Under these circumstances and only under these 
circumstances, the UN might consider hiring paid, volunteer, professionally-trained 
security personnel, employed without regard to national origin and beholden to its 
employer rather than to any single government, to secure the deliveries of emergency 
assistance. The concept was seriously considered in Rwanda in late 1994. In the fall of 
1994, the UN received a proposal from a British company to provide training and 
support to Zaire's army in order to wrest control of the camps from the militias. The 
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idea received support from one permanent member of the Security Council, but other 
members rejected the idea on the basis of cost and principle. 
The primary purpose of private security guards would not be to protect NGO 
personnel, but to avoid the need to hire local providers from among belligerents to 
protect convoys of relief assistance. In eastern Zaire, for example, after months of 
inaction, two battalions of Zairian troops were hired to maintain security in Rwandan 
camps under UNHCR authority. The presence of the troops significantly improved law 
and order in the camps and diminished the authority of the militias among the refugees 
(Prendergast, 1995). Even then, the Zairian troops were not impartial in the broader 
conflict within Rwanda nor were they mandated to deal with the central issue of 
separating refugees from militia leaders. At the very least, private security personnel 
from outside the region would not fuel the local war economy nor sustain those who 
prey on local populations. 
This kind of proposal will not be well received within the humanitarian 
community and many would consider it infeasible. For both practical and normative 
reasons, NGOs undoubtedly would prefer to avoid such a solution. There are already 
indications, however, that the hiring of security guards from the private sector is 
acceptable under specified conditions in the humanitarian community. The ICRC 
prohibits the hiring of local armed escorts for relief convoys, but acknowledges that the 
hiring of guards to combat crime and provide security for personnel may be necessary 
if there is no other option. When armed guards are necessary, the ICRC recommends 
that they be hired from “an established security firm or the police rather than the army” 
(ICRC, 1995, 1997). A report recently submitted to the European Commission 
proposed that donors could field security units to protect humanitarian work, either 
from national resources or “through funding specialist third parties” (European 
Commission, 1999). It is worth considering whether the hiring of security guards from 
specialized third parties is an appropriate strategy not only to combat crime but also to 
mitigate the violence that flows inadvertently from current  policies. Private providers 
of security working under the authority of the United Nations may be the least harmful 
response both to the privatization of assistance and to the absence of security as a 
public good. 
Conditionality and Exit. Finally, and only as a desperate last resort, NGOs must be 
prepared to consider seriously the option of withdrawal when assistance intended for 
humanitarian purposes is being diverted into renewed cycles of conflict. Withdrawal 
during an emergency flies in the face of the most fundamental humanitarian 
commitment and impulse to protect lives at risk: NGOs cannot justify the loss of access 
and witness. Yet, only if  humanitarian actors are willing to suspend delivery and 
withdraw presence when their assistance is forming part of a cycle of violence, can 
they regain sufficient leverage to retain or recapture control over delivery and 
management of relief supplies, and to re-convert presence into protection. When other 
options are exhausted, NGOs must be willing to take the necessary organizational steps 
to ensure that they are not part of the problems they are committed to alleviate. 
Strategic withdrawal can also send crucial signals to future would-be perpetrators of 
violence hoping to use relief resources for their own purposes. 
To argue that NGOs must consider withdrawing if assets are being diverted to fuel 
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a war economy raises operational, strategic, and ethical questions. Can NGOs withdraw 
in the midst of an emergency?    In the past, humanitarians have withdrawn largely 
when their staff were harmed or at risk -- the ICRC from Burundi and Chechnya, 
Caritas from Burundi -- or when necessary infrastructure was destroyed -- CARE from 
Mogadishu, and almost all NGOs from Liberia in 1996. 
Withdrawal as a strategic choice is rare, but humanitarian NGOs have very 
occasionally made this choice. In eastern Zaire in November 1994, fifteen NGOs 
withdrew from Mugunga camp in the Goma region in the face of attempts by militias to 
assert political control over the camps. The decision was made in response to untenable 
security conditions and unacceptable ethical compromises, but also to increase pressure 
on the international community to respond to the security dilemma. At the same time, 
in a controversial decision, ECHO decided to stop all funding for NGOs serving the 
internally displaced camps within Rwanda, hoping to create a “push” for people to 
return to their homes. The impact of the withdrawal is unclear, since agencies with 
independent funding, that considered continued assistance as a humanitarian 
imperative, remained in the camps. 
If humanitarian NGOs are to consider withdrawal as a strategy to influence 
warring parties and reluctant major powers, they need the capacity to assess the 
severity of the negative consequences of their aid, and a set of diagnostics that they can 
collectively use to judge that they may be doing more harm than good. 
It is possible to identify a set of diagnostics, but with the caveat that there is 
significant variation within complex humanitarian emergencies and the diagnostics will 
be sensitive to the difference in context. The likelihood of negative externalities of 
assistance depends in part on the degree of coherence among militias and their capacity 
to organize effectively; when it is very high, as it was in Rwanda, diversion is more 
likely than when coherence is low, as it was in Sierra Leone. Diversion also depends in 
part on the popular support that militias enjoy and the political control they exercise; 
when it is high, as it was in Rwanda, diversion is more likely than if control is limited 
as it was in Sierra Leone. 
The taxation of relief. The political taxation of relief is an obvious indicator that 
aid is being diverted. Initially, diversion can be difficult to assess since theft and 
hijacking can be high, but not part of a pattern of systematic political diversion. The 
better informed NGO personnel are about local political and military organizations, 
about ethnic and religious fault lines, and about local social, economic, and political 
structures, the more easily they will be able to distinguish simple theft from systematic 
diversion. Systematic political diversion, which is not reduced by the strategies we 
considered earlier, should trigger consideration of a coordinated withdrawal. 
Failure by local authorities to cooperate in registration. A second warning light is 
the unwillingness of  local authorities to cooperate with the UN and NGOs to register 
recipients of relief assistance, especially in refugee or displaced persons’ camps, and to 
make lists of registrants available. The failure to cooperate in registration suggests that 
local authorities are seeking to supplant or subvert existing distribution mechanisms in 
order to divert relief assistance.  If local authorities are willing to use force to 
monopolize control over registration process, there is a very high likelihood that aid 
will subsequently become a resource for violent conflict. 
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Obstruction of access. Negotiation of access to populations at risk often provides 
predatory governments and militias with the opportunity to impose inequitable political 
conditions that privilege some vulnerable populations at the expense of others. 
Especially when access is obstructed after consent has been obtained, relief is being 
used as an instrument to assert control over local populations for political purposes. 
The government of Mobuto Sese Seko, for example, repeatedly denied access to large 
groups of refugees and displaced persons. Access is central to protection, support, and 
witness. 
When NGOs recognize that their assistance is doing more harm than good, that 
saving lives in the short term may increase deaths over the longer term, consideration 
of strategic withdrawal hinges in part, but only in part, on their contractual obligations. 
The large NGOs, with the capacity to deliver significant amounts of assistance quickly, 
are almost all dependent on one of six or seven UN agencies or an agency within their 
home government for an implementing contract. Contracts can consequently be a 
constraint or an inducement to making relief conditional. UN agencies typically insist 
on non-negotiable rates, payment schedules and penalty clauses. Schedules and penalty 
clauses can work against a decision to make assistance conditional, insofar as the NGO 
violates the contract either by politically motivated withdrawal or by allowing waiting 
time for compellant strategies to work. Instead of an obstacle, agency contracts could 
create incentives for conditional relief. Contracts could include incentives to assist in 
the monitoring and reporting on abuse of vulnerable populations, and require regular 
reporting of agreed upon indicators of diversion of assistance. They could also reduce 
the penalties that are an obstacle to withdrawal, provided that withdrawal occurs within 
defined parameters and in accordance with agreed upon principles. 
A far more important constraint on strategic withdrawal is the difficulty of 
collective action. A unilateral withdrawal by one NGO, no matter how large, is unlikely 
to be effective in constraining the behavior of predators. Even the collective withdrawal 
from Mugunga had only limited impact; the NGOs who withdrew continued to provide 
relief in other camps and the flow of resources into Mugunga continued. At least two 
conditions are necessary if a strategic withdrawal by NGOs is to have any impact. 
First, there must be coordination among the principal NGOs who are providing 
assistance to act in concert. This kind of decision will not be easily reached; many 
NGOs continue to believe that withdrawal violates the fundamental humanitarian ethic, 
that it is tantamount to abandoning the most vulnerable, that it will provoke looting and 
violence, and that the politics of withdrawal compromise humanitarian neutrality and 
impartiality. The most serious criticism leveled at a strategy of political withdrawal is 
that it is ineffective. In the aftermath of the cessation of humanitarian aid to Rwandan 
refugees, violence and war increased, and several hundred thousand people died; the 
Great Lakes region was less violent with international humanitarian assistance than it 
became when that aid was withdrawn. This intense debate among humanitarians may 
limit the possibilities of coordination to arrangements between those who leave and 
those who stay, so that there can be both public statement and quiet assistance. Within 
the limits of the possible, consulting recipients of assistance -- rather than the predatory 
leadership -- as to whether agencies should remain silent or protest against abuses even 
if they lose their access, would empower local populations, enhance accountability, and 
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make it easier for NGOs to reach a collective decision. 
Second, a withdrawal  should be accompanied by a clearly stated set of conditions 
for return -- an end to diversion of relief, unobstructed access to vulnerable 
populations, and/or cooperation in registration of refugees or displaced persons. There 
are cases where conditionality has succeeded. In response to looting of cars in Eastern 
Equatoria, four NGOs and agencies collaborated to make continuing assistance 
conditional on safety on the roads, as an essential component of the larger principle of 
unfettered secure access. The SPLA  were concerned enough about the consequences 
of a cessation of aid that they made certain that the raiding of vehicles stopped. A 
consortium of NGOs working in southern Sudan insisted on independent access and 
monitoring as conditions of continued assistance. Only if withdrawal is coordinated and 
strategic, if the conditions NGOs set can be met by the targets, can concerted 
withdrawal have any impact whatsoever on the behavior of a predatory government or 
militia. 
 
In the Eye of the Storm 
 
 Humanitarian NGOs have become important participants as assistance has been 
privatized and great powers interests and commitments have waned. They remain loyal 
and committed to humanitarian ethics, to the promotion of the welfare of those most at 
risk and most vulnerable. To do their work effectively, NGOs now recognize that those 
they seek to help must have voice, and it is their voice that, wherever possible, must be 
heard and taken most seriously.  
 Finally, in large part because of the failure of the wider international community 
to provide security as a public good, humanitarians increasingly find themselves in a 
cruel dilemma. In complex humanitarian emergencies, where security is absent, some 
of the assistance NGOs provide has gone to those who prey on the vulnerable and has 
fueled the cycle of violence. Far from contributing to conflict resolution, they have 
inadvertently contributed to conflict escalation.  
 The political strategies that I have outlined, alone or in combination, can alleviate 
some of these negative consequences, under some circumstances. They are, however, 
no panacea. At the extreme, the humanitarian imperative compels exit, not presence. As 
controversial, and as unwelcome as these recommendations are, they must be taken 
seriously if humanitarian space is to be preserved. Humanitarians must consider the 
politics of their presence in complex emergencies seriously and, in so doing, will 
inevitably come to consider the politics of their absence.  
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Abstract 
 
 This paper suggests a two-level game analysis of Israel’s strategy toward peace 
during the 1990s. The paper shows how various paradoxes in Israeli society create 
domestic obstacles and internal opposition that weaken Israel’s bargaining position 
toward neighboring countries. Treating domestic parameters in these countries as a 
given, we argue that Israeli leaders can hardly use this weakness to manipulate 
information in the bargaining process, because neighboring countries can observe 
Israel’s internal processes. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the 
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards neighboring 
polities, especially the Palestinians, without actually creating the necessary internal 
conditions for such a policy, may finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – 
in terms of territory and deterrent ability – since it will have to compromise under 
difficult conditions. Several practical implications as to the preferred bargaining 
process under these conditions follow. 
 
Introduction 
 
During his service as Secretary of State in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger once 
stated that Israel did not have a foreign policy, it had only domestic policy. By that he 
meant that Israel’s foreign policy is primarily the result of internal conditions and 
constraints. Yet since this claim was made, students of Israel’s foreign and strategic 
policy, especially within the discipline of international relations, have not dealt with 
this issue systematically. Most studies focus on the balance of power between Israel 
and the neighboring countries as measured by armed forces, territory and security 
budget (Karsh and Mahler, 1994). Kissinger’s observation seems more correct than 
ever in the 1990s, however, in light of events since the signing of the Oslo Agreement.  
 This observation was reaffirmed recently, in May 2000, when Israel unilaterally 
withdrew from Lebanon. The withdrawal followed strong internal pressures that were 
interpreted by many as a significant decline in the willingness of the Israeli public to 
pay the price of conflict. Indeed, Sheik Nassralla, the leader of the Southern Lebanese 
guerrilla organization Hizbullah, called on the Palestinians to observe how weak Israel 
had become despite its military strength. 
 This paper analyzes the impact of internal socio-political and economic processes 
in Israel on its strategic position in the Middle East, and especially its peace strategy 
during the 1990s. We assume that Israel is facing a bloc of hostile countries composed 
of players such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and parts of Palestinian society. The interests 
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of these players may differ in certain aspects, and they do not necessarily coordinate 
their strategy towards Israel. We assume, however, that their basic calculations 
concerning Israel are similar, and therefore concentrate on domestic variables that 
influence Israel’s strategic choices while treating domestic parameters in the hostile 
bloc as a given. 
 The paper uses the general concept of “nested games,” where players’ interests 
and actions in one game are influenced by their involvement in others (Tsebelis, 1990; 
Colomer, 1995). Specifically, the paper applies the idea of a two-level game, as 
developed for analyzing international relations and foreign policy (Schelling, 1960; 
Putnam, 1988; Iida, 1993; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993; Schneider and 
Cederman, 1994; Mo, 1995; Schultz, 1998). Two-level game literature has introduced 
solid micro foundations to the theory of international bargaining. Most importantly, this 
research tradition has shown that the amount of uncertainty in the international system 
is not a given but can be manipulated both for the better and for the worse. This 
ambiguous potential is the essence of a two-level dilemma in world politics in which 
domestic politics affects international behavior both positively and negatively, and vice 
versa – clearly, international conditions also affect domestic politics, which again 
affects foreign policy. To avoid a cyclical argument, we concentrate on explaining 
foreign policy based on internal conditions. The opposite direction of this mutual 
dependency between foreign and domestic policy will be discussed only when 
necessary.  
 A major debate in the literature is whether domestic obstacles weaken or 
strengthen the state’s bargaining position in international negotiations. Putnam (1988) 
has shown how negotiators might claim successfully that domestic opposition prevents 
them from concurring in an international agreement. Iida (1993) questions this 
argument and relies on sequential bargaining to analyze how domestic constraints 
impact the negotiations between two states, given various assumptions regarding 
information. One basic result is that a country’s bargaining leverage does not 
necessarily increase when its domestic constraints become more severe. When there is 
complete information about domestic constraints, the constrained negotiator has a 
bargaining advantage only if the constraints are severe. When there is asymmetric 
international information, the constrained negotiator will benefit only if the foreign 
negotiator strongly believes that the home negotiator is severely constrained. Finally, 
Iida (1993) shows that when there is incomplete domestic information (on the side of 
the home negotiator), the constrained negotiator has a bargaining advantage if the 
probability of successful ratification increases with the share that this side receives. 
This opens up the possibility for misinterpretation, which may lead to efficiency loss. 
On the other hand, Schultz (1998) shows that as there is more domestic competition in 
a state (e.g., in democratic regimes), the ex ante probability of war decreases, since a 
strategic opposition party helps reveal information about the state’s preferences. In this 
paper, we argue that the Schultz model is more accurate than the Iida model for 
analyzing the interaction between Israel and the neighboring countries. Given Israel’s 
democratic regime, neighboring countries can easily obtain information about Israel’s 
internal processes. 
 Empirical studies also question Putnam’s argument. According to Evans et al 
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(1993: 409), leaders “did try to strategically misinterpret their own politics, but not as 
often as expected, and with much less success.” In Moravscik’s view (1993: 159), 
bluffing is rare because governments might be able to predict the actions of an eventual 
cheater: “…among modern information-rich democracies, it is extremely difficult for 
negotiators to mask their true domestic win-set, even in a sensitive area of national 
security like weapons procurement.” In other words, as the clarity of a state’s domestic 
obstacles increases, the ability of the state’s leaders to manipulate this information in 
the bargaining process declines. Such clarity is more likely in democracies, but in many 
cases it also exists in non-democratic systems.  
 With regard to Israel’s strategic choices and foreign policy in the Middle East 
during the 1990s, this paper shows how domestic obstacles and internal opposition 
weaken Israel’s bargaining position towards the hostile bloc it faces. We also argue that 
using this weakness to manipulate information is unlikely to be advantageous, because 
of the characteristics of two-level interaction, as mentioned above. 
 During the 1990s Israel faced several challenges – especially the Gulf War in 
1991 and the armament of states like Syria and Iran – which threatened to upset the 
balance of power between it and several neighboring countries that comprise a hostile 
bloc. Those events, as well as the Palestinian uprising (“Intifada”) since 1987, led 
Israeli leaders to devise a peace policy that found expression in the Oslo Agreement 
signed in September 1993 (Peres and Naor, 1993). However, due to internal opposition 
within both Israeli and Palestinian societies, the peace process, which brought great 
hope to the region, gradually slowed down. Moslem and Jewish fundamentalists 
committed terrorist attacks on civilian populations. The Israeli Prime Minister who 
made peace, Yitzhak Rabin, was murdered at a political rally by a Jewish extremist, 
and Palestinian suicide bombers took the lives of many Israelis. Thus, the public mood 
was more open to the right-wing campaign that brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power 
in 1996. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “The air of 
optimism generated by the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake on the lawn of the White 
House in September 1993, dissipated long ago… official Israeli statements refer to the 
process as going through a critical stage. The Secretary-General of the Palestinian 
Cabinet, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, has gone much further. In March 1998, he announced 
the death of the peace process.” (IISS, 1998: 144).  
 The shift in Israel’s approach to the peace process cannot be attributed solely to 
the fact that a right-wing government governed Israel from May 1996 to May 1999. We 
argue, rather, that it is not only ideological considerations that explain the slow-down 
of the peace process but also several paradoxes within Israeli society. Since the 
Palestinians, as well as other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders 
are hardly able to use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining 
process, as might be theorized according to Schelling (1960: 22) and Putnam (1988). 
Therefore, a precondition for an Israeli leader to halt the peace process for any reason 
and take a conflictual approach toward the hostile bloc is to shape the preferences of 
Israeli society. This includes convincing the different population segments that Israel is 
playing a non-cooperative game with its neighbors – especially the Palestinians – and 
creating a willingness to tolerate the high cost of violent conflict. We show, however, 
that the deepening polarization of Israeli society in various dimensions makes it very 
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hard to create such beliefs. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the 
impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards the hostile 
bloc, without actually creating the necessary internal conditions for such policy, may 
finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – in terms of territory and deterrence 
ability – since it will have to compromise under difficult conditions. Once Israeli 
leaders understand these limitations, it is highly probable that they will form a peace 
strategy that takes into account the different interests and sensitivities of the 
neighboring states. Further, the analysis suggests that a consensus in Israeli society may 
be achieved if there is a sequential bargaining process on crucial issues, with decisions 
on each issue being taken one at a time, followed by implementation and evaluation of 
outcomes.  
 The paper is organized as follows. The following section uses games in presenting 
the development of power relations and equilibria in the Middle East until the 1990s. 
The next section discusses domestic conditions that influence Israel’s strategic choices, 
as well as its peace policy. Subsequently, we model and explain the possible impact of 
those domestic conditions on Israel’s strategy toward the peace process with the 
Palestinians.  
 
The Development of Power Relations in the Middle East 
 
 The main characteristic of the relations between Israel and neighboring countries 
has been that these countries did not recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent 
state. Until 1977 this was the position of all Arab countries; since then several states – 
Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and some Persian Gulf states – have joined the peace 
process to some extent. Hostile countries, however, such as Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, 
still do not recognize Israel’s right to exist. As for the Israeli side, it has recognized all 
Arab states, other than the Palestinians’ right to an independent state. Moreover, until 
1967 the conflict was not about “the occupied territories” but concerned, rather, most 
of the area of Israel as one large occupied territory. The minimal demand was for Israel 
to give up territories it occupied in the 1948 Independence War and to allow the return 
of Palestinian refugees. The maximal demand, of course, was the abolition of Israel as 
an independent state. As a result, the Israeli national security conception has been 
defensive at the strategic level and offensive at the operative level (Horowitz, 1975). 
The defensive approach at the strategic level has relied on conventional and non-
conventional deterrence, motivating a reciprocal arms race between Israel and its 
neighbors (Aronson, 1984).  
 Given the existential nature of the conflict until the early 1970s, the power 
relations between the Arab countries and Israel during that period can be best described 
as a zero-sum game. First, we will illustrate this argument by specifying the 
preferences of Israel and its neighbors, excluding the Palestinians, until the mid-1970s. 
Then we will explain how, since the mid-1970s, the game between Israel and some 
neighboring countries has been transformed into a symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma (see 
also: Brams, 1994: 85-7, 101-2). Finally, we suggest a game for analyzing the power 
relations between Israel and the Palestinians.  
 In the first stage, the players – Israel (I) and a given neighboring country (N) – are 
Shlomo Mizrahi, Abraham Mehrez, Arye Naor 47
 
 
modeled as unitary players, i.e., they are assumed to be homogeneous societies. In this 
game each side has two strategies. Israel can cooperate (C) with the neighboring 
country by signing a peace treaty which satisfies the neighboring country's territorial 
(or other) demands to some extent, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not give 
up any territory but has to invest in building deterrent ability. The neighboring country 
can cooperate (C) with Israel by recognizing its legitimacy to exist and signing a peace 
treaty, or not cooperate (D), meaning that it does not recognize Israel and has to invest 
in the arms race. The combination of these strategies creates four possible outcomes: 
 
 C-C: Both sides cooperate. 
 D-C: Israel does not cooperate while the neighboring country cooperates. 
 C-D: Israel cooperates while the neighboring country does not cooperate. 
 D-D: Neither side cooperates. 
 
 The players’ preferences for these outcomes are as follows: Israel mostly prefers 
D-C, because then it benefits from the neighboring country’s cooperation without 
giving up any territory (α). Israel’s least preferred outcome is C-D, because then it 
gives up territory without benefiting (δ). It pays a price both in terms of territory and by 
further investment in building deterrent ability. Israel prefers mutual cooperation (β), 
C-C, to mutual defection (γ), D-D, because then it can attain peace for its citizens and 
reduce the cost of an arms buildup. The underlying assumption is that Israel recognizes 
the benefits of peace even at the cost of territorial compromise. As will be shown later, 
if this is not the case for both sides, the conflict is even deeper than that described by a 
zero-sum game or by the prisoners’ dilemma. Israel’s order of preferences is: 
   α = (D,C) > β= (C,C) > γ= (D,D) > δ = (C,D) 
 
 The neighboring country has calculations similar to those of Israel for D-C and C-
D. Yet, as explained, until the mid-1970s the neighboring countries did not recognize 
Israel’s legitimacy to exist and therefore preferred mutual defection to mutual 
cooperation. That is, the neighboring country in this game did not believe it could attain 
any benefits from mutual cooperation while it could benefit from escalating the 
conflict. It follows that the neighboring country prefers D-D to C-C; thus, its order of 
preference is: 
α = (C,D) > β= (D,D) > γ = (C,C) > δ= (D,C) 
 
Figure 1: A Zero-Sum Game between Israel and a Hostile Neighboring Country 
 
                   Hostile Bloc  
                    C                D 
             C        β, γ              δ, α  
              Israel 
             D        α, δ             γ, β  
The players’ order of preference is presented in a game matrix in Figure 1 where 
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α>β>γ>δ. This is a zero-sum game where one player’s win is the other’s loss. 
Technically, if the order is presented in terms of numbers, e.g., 1,2,3,4, the sum in each 
cell is the same. In this game, both players have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation 
(D) leading to the unique Nash equilibrium (γ, β). This means that in a situation of 
conflict the neighboring country is better off than Israel since it does not recognize any 
benefits from cooperation.  
 It follows that any change in the equilibrium outcome, which existed until the 
mid-1970s, required a preference change by the neighboring country. The change came 
about due to certain changes in attitude after the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 
(Stein, 1985). This and other processes we will not discuss here changed the attitudes 
of some neighboring countries about cooperation (Mansur, 1985). They began 
recognizing the advantages of mutual cooperation, meaning that the zero-sum game 
presented in Figure 1 was transformed into the symmetrical prisoners’ dilemma 
presented in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: A Symmetric Prisoners’ Dilemma between Israel and a Neighboring Country 
 
      Neighboring Country 
                  C               D 
             C        β, β            δ, α  
            Israel 
             D        α, δ            γ, γ   
 
 
In this game, neither Israel nor the neighboring country is motivated to begin 
cooperating on its own. Therefore, both sides stay with their dominant strategy of non-
cooperation and the equilibrium remains very stable. It is commonly argued that the 
players can reach a Pareto-optimal outcome (β, β) when a third party intervenes and 
creates incentives for (or forces) cooperation.  
 Third party intervention is usually discussed in the literature with respect to 
intrastate, often ethnic, conflicts (Licklider, 1993; Gurr, 1993; Gottlieb, 1993). Walter 
(1997), for example, studied 41 civil wars between 1940 and 1990, and showed the 
importance of third-party intervention in finding successful negotiated solutions. She 
argues that negotiated settlements do not fail because bargains cannot be struck but, 
rather, because it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange 
credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement. Regan (1996) also studied all 
intrastate conflicts since 1944, showing that it is the characteristics of the intervention 
strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict that largely determine the success 
of the intervention. Thus, third-party intervention is required both to create incentives 
for cooperation and to guarantee the terms of compromise.  
 Indeed, under the new circumstances created by the 1973 war, the intervention of 
a third party became possible and American mediation led to the first peace treaty in 
the Middle East – between Israel and Egypt. In that peace process both incentives and 
guarantees were needed. 
 To complete the analysis of the historical conditions, we now suggest a game to 
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describe the power relations between Israel and the Palestinians until the early 1990s. 
As explained, in that period neither Israel nor the Palestinians recognized the other’s 
right to form an independent state. Therefore, the essence of the conflict was 
existential, meaning that neither side recognized the advantages of mutual cooperation. 
The order of preferences that corresponds to this situation is that of the neighboring 
country in Figure 1. If neither side recognizes the advantages of mutual cooperation, 
the D-D outcome is preferred to the C-C one.  
 
Figure 3: The Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians when Both Sides 
                Do Not Recognize the Advantages of Mutual Cooperation  
 
                   Palestinians  
                        C                  D 
              C       γ, γ               δ, α  
                           Israel 
             D      α, δ              β, β  
 
 
Figure 3 shows that, under the above-mentioned condition, not only is there a 
dominant strategy of non-cooperation for both sides but also the Nash equilibrium is 
Pareto-optimal (β, β). In other words, both sides believe they win something in a D-D 
situation while they would only lose in a C-C situation. This means that even if there is 
a third party who wants to force an agreement, it will have to invest a lot of resources, 
because the cost of mutual cooperation is higher than the cost of mutual non-
cooperation. In comparison, in the prisoners’ dilemma the choice of D-D is due to Nash 
equilibrium calculations leading to a situation of mutually hurting stalemate situation 
(Zartman, 1991). In such a case, a third party’s intervention can evidently help the sides 
achieve cooperation.  
 This equilibrium analysis does not refer to domestic variables because until the 
mid-1970s Israeli society and political culture were uni-dimensional on the security 
issue  (Arian, 1985; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). Internal conflicts were covered by 
the belief that it was necessary to defend the country, as long as the Labor party 
governed Israel, from 1948 to 1977. This homogeneous political culture began to 
change in 1977 when the Likud party formed a coalition for the first time. This 
electoral change expressed and triggered the polarization of Israeli society in several 
aspects. As a result, Israel’s strategic choices and calculations in its relations with 
neighboring countries have been transformed.  
 
Internal Processes Influencing Israel’s Strategy toward Peace in the Late 1990s 
 
The socio-political and economic processes during 1977-1998 highlight five 
dimensions that influence Israel’s power and strategic choices in the international 
scene: The socio-economic dimension, the ethnic-religious dimension, the geographical 
dimension in terms of center-periphery relations, the security dimension in light of the 
Arab-Israel conflict, and the dimension of arms buildup, both conventional and non-
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conventional. In this section, we describe the polarization in each dimension and the 
mutual dependence between them. According to opinion polls, 30% of the Jewish-
Israeli population regard the increased internal tension among various segments of the 
people as the most important problem on Israel’s public agenda, and 31% so regard the 
slowdown in the economy, while only 19% regard the stalemate in the peace process as 
the most important problem facing Israel (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998). Since the 
polarization in the various dimensions merge with each other, any Israeli government 
potentially faces significant domestic difficulties in building a consensus around a 
foreign policy.  
 The Socio-Economic Dimension: Traditionally the Israeli economy has been 
characterized as highly centralized due to the socialist political culture (Horowitz and 
Lissak, 1989). The 1990s, however, have been characterized by privatization processes, 
with various social and economic consequences. These processes include market 
liberalization, deregulation, transfer of control and management to stockholders, and 
attempts by international companies to enter the Israeli market (Office for Economic 
Planning’s Report, 1994). Another aspect of these processes is the creation of 
flexibility and mobilization in the labor force, thus intensifying socio-economic 
inequality. Further, due to security problems during the Palestinian uprising 
(“Intifada”), the Israeli economy became dependent on cheap imported labor to replace 
cheap Palestinian workers. The large number of imported workers from Africa, South-
East Asia and Eastern Europe created significant social, demographic and moral 
problems due to their very low wages, inequality and lack of basic social and labor 
rights (Kondor, 1997). This labor policy, which was encouraged by the government, 
also created significant difficulties for the Palestinian economy, which was highly 
dependent on the Israeli economy (Roy, 1995).  
 The growing socio-economic gaps together with rising unemployment became one 
of the main issues dividing Israeli society, creating a potential for conflict. Further, 
when the polarization of this dimension merges with polarization in other dimensions, 
the potential for conflict intensifies. This leads us to the second dimension listed above. 
 The Ethnic-Religious Dimension:  Israeli society is made up of Jewish immigrants 
from many countries. From the 1920s to the 1940s, these immigrants came mainly 
from Europe, thus creating a predominantly Western-oriented culture (Horowitz and 
Lissak, 1989). During the 1950s, after the establishment of the State of Israel, there was 
large-scale immigration from Arab and Muslim states, thus changing the proportion 
between the Western-oriented population segment, usually termed “Ashkenazi” and the 
Eastern-oriented population segment, usually termed “Sephardi.” The arrival of  
Sephardim in a predominantly Western-oriented culture created many difficulties for 
them in becoming established (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989:117). Over the long term, 
this ethnic division merged with the socio-economic polarization:  The lower classes 
were mostly composed of Sephardim, and this intensified their feelings of 
discrimination and deprivation.  
 Furthermore, many Sephardim were religiously observant, and thus the orthodox-
secular polarization in Israeli society also merged with the previous two (Liebman, 
1997; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). On the other hand, national-religious Ashkenazim 
also share the popular feeling of traditional Sephardim against the individualism that 
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characterizes the willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians and to recognize the 
PLO. In the previous decade, Israel (together with Portugal) had been excluded from 
Western individualism, on the grounds of its collectivist culture (Hofstede, 1983; 
Huntington, 1996: 71). As Liebman (1997: 102-103) notes, in the current era of 
growing individualist ethos, religious Zionists are the sector most committed to the 
values of Israel’s civil religion. The religious import of their political and cultural 
approach gives it a sense of holiness that separates religiously orthodox people from 
the rest of society. The merging of polarization in the two dimensions discussed so far 
(i.e., the socio-economic and the ethnic-religious dimensions) intensifies the conflicts 
between these population segments. It also presents great difficulty in terms of 
mobilizing the entire society for a given cause, because the bonds that maintained a 
certain national consensus until 1977 no longer exist. The polarization in other 
dimensions further intensifies the problem. 
 The Geographical Dimension of Center-Periphery Relations: Interestingly 
enough, polarization in the geographical dimension also fits the other aspects discussed 
thus far. Many new immigrants to Israel during the 1950s were sent to the periphery, 
especially to development towns in the south and north of Israel, while the political, 
economic and geographical centers (i.e., Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem) were dominated by 
the upper and middle classes (Arian, 1985; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989; Lipshitz, 1996; 
Waterman, 1996). As a result, the periphery is dominated by traditional and religious, 
lower-class Sephardim. It follows that the geographical division of Israeli society also 
fits the other aspects of polarization and inferiority, as well as their political 
consequences.  
 The Security Dimension relative to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: This dimension has 
been dominant in Israeli society for most of the century (Arian, 1985; Arian and 
Shamir, 1990; Barzilai, 1996; Sened, 1996). The question of territorial compromise in 
exchange for peace has been at the center of political debate since the beginning of 
Zionism. Other questions, such as Israeli-Jewish identity, usually merged into this 
dimension. In this respect, until 1977 there was a national consensus on the policy 
adopted by the Labor-led government (Arian and Shamir, 1990). However, the socio-
political and economic processes discussed so far also influenced this dimension. Since 
the early 1980s – especially since the 1982 Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon – the 
polarization between right and left in Israeli society intensified (Arian and Shamir, 
1990; 1994; Horowitz and Lissak, 1989).  
 To a large extent this polarization fits the divisions in the other dimensions – 
lower-class voters, the Sephardim, voters in the periphery, and religious voters 
traditionally support right-wing parties (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998; Shamir 
and Arian, 1999). Shamir and Arian (1999) present a logistic regression based on a 
longitudinal analysis of electoral cleavages from 1969 to 1996, and an analysis of the 
1996 election. They show that religious, Sephardim, less educated, and lower status 
workers voted for the right-wing Likud and religious parties, whereas the left (Labor 
and Meretz) has had a disproportionate share of secular, upper class Ashkenazi voters. 
Since voting patterns significantly correlate with the preferences concerning the peace 
process, this cross-sectional characterization fits the polarization in the security 
dimension. This argument is also supported by an ongoing monthly opinion poll done 
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by Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000), beginning in August 1993. These polls, also called 
the peace index, basically examine the public’s attitudes toward the peace process 
given ongoing events and the divisions in Israeli society. As explained earlier, the 
range of alternatives in Israel’s policy toward neighboring countries is ultimately 
reduced to a dichotomous choice: A person is either for or against giving up territory in 
exchange for peace. This distinction is the basis for the poll questions. The participants 
sampled are representative of the Jewish population of Israel. According to this 
continuing opinion poll, the religious population in general, and the Ultra-Orthodox in 
particular, has assumed the role of the radical right-wing symbol for everything 
touching on the peace process (Ya’ar and Hermann, 1997a). Among the Ultra-
Orthodox only 20.5% support or greatly support the process; among those defining 
themselves as Religious 43% support the process. On the other hand, 82% of 
traditionalist and 78% of secular groups declared their support for the process (Ya’ar 
and Hermann, 1997b).  
 Thus, low-class voters, Sephardim, peripheral voters and religious voters 
traditionally support right-wing parties. Although some of these voters do not 
completely accept the right-wing attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they vote for 
right-wing parties based on their calculations and preferences in the other dimensions 
(Arian and Shamir, 1990; 1994). As a result, Israeli society faces the paradox that a 
small majority of the population favors the peace process, but this is not clearly 
expressed in the political division of power.  
Table 1 shows there is long-standing support for the peace process, but 
Netanyahu still won the May 1996 election even though he challenged the peace policy 
of his predecessors, Rabin and Peres. It was only in the May 1999 election that the left-
wing candidate, Barak, took over from Netanyahu, and that supporters of the peace 
process received nearly 50% of the seats in the parliament. Thus, since May 1999 the 
near-50% support for the peace process has been expressed in the political division of 
power. 
Table 1 also shows certain changes in the support for the peace process over the 
months. Although these changes are not statistically significant, they are usually 
attributed to events and developments in the peace process. For example, violent 
attacks by the Palestinians in the territories or by Hizbullah in Lebanon are clearly 
followed by declining support for the peace process. Thus, the two-level dynamic also 
works in the opposite direction. Not only do internal processes influence foreign policy 
but international events and developments also influence internal beliefs and processes. 
It is often argued, for example, that the slowdown in the peace process during 1994-95 
can be attributed to the murderous car bombs exploded by extreme Palestinians, which 
killed many Israelis.  
 It follows that the deep polarization in the socio-economic, ethnic-religious and 
geographical dimensions project strongly onto the security dimension, thus creating 
great domestic difficulty for any peace policy. Furthermore, the deep polarization 
between different social segments creates domestic difficulties for any foreign policy, 
because Israel’s leaders cannot create a consensus for a militarist policy either. As 
expressed through their behavior during the Gulf War and the long-standing conflict in 
Lebanon and the occupied territories, many of Israel’s citizens are no longer willing to 
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pay the high price of a non-consensual war (Barzilai, 1996; Ya’ar and Hermann, 1998). 
This approach also affects the fifth dimension mentioned above – arms buildup, both 
conventional and non-conventional. 
 
Table 1: The Level of Support in the Peace Process with the Palestinians among 
  the  Jewish-Israeli Population – August 1993-April 2000 
 
       Time In favor 
(percent) 
      Time  In favor  
    
(percent) 
August 1993       53 June 1997       50.2     
June 1994       51 September 1997       45.9 
December 1994       47.4 December 1997       49.4 
March 1995       48.5 March 1998       50.9 
September 1995       45.3 September 1998       47.2 
December 1995       55.8 December 1998       52.2 
March 1996       50.5 April 1999       56.8 
June 1996       48.4 August 1999       47.8 
September 1996       50 November 1999       51.7 
December 1996       54.5 April 2000       47.9 
March 1997       48 August 2000       45.3 
 Source: Yaar and Hermann (1993-2000) 
 
 The Dimension of Non-conventional Deterrence: For many years Israel 
maintained a policy of obscuring its nuclear capability, by stating it would not be the 
first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East (Aronson, 1992). 
Nevertheless, it became common belief that Israel had an impressive nuclear 
endowment. Based on his impressions from Egyptian leaders, Peres attributed Egypt’s 
decision to make peace with Israel to that capability, in part (Peres and Naor, 1993: 4-
5). It did not, however, prevent Egypt from launching a limited war against Israel four 
years earlier. According to some accounts, in 1973 Israel already had nuclear arms, 
which could be deployed from aircraft and missiles (Hersh, 1991: 215-6; Paul, 1995). 
Israeli deterrent calculations were based on the possession of superior conventional and 
nuclear capability, and the Israeli leadership implicitly declared this capability to be its 
ultimate deterrent against an Arab attack:  Before the October 1973 war, leaders such 
 Israel's Strategy toward Peace 54
 
 
as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan hinted at the Israeli nuclear deterrent and made 
ambiguous nuclear threats (Evron, 1990; Bar-Joseph, 1982; Feldman, 1982; Freedman, 
1975). Dayan reportedly believed that the Arab states would not initiate a war before 
the early 1980s, and until then Israel’s nuclear capability likely would act as a deterrent 
against conventional attack. From 1967 to 1973, the Arab leaders and the media talked 
unceasingly of Israeli nuclear capability and the implications of it (Van Creveld, 1993: 
108-110; Evron, 1973: 19-31). The Egyptians were also presumed to have received 
intelligence information on Israel’s nuclear weapons and strategy from Soviet spies 
who had penetrated the state’s defense and intelligence establishments (Hersh, 1991: 
219). 
 However, non-conventional deterrence capability did not deter Egypt and Syria 
from starting a conventional war in October 1973. Stein (1985) suggests that Egyptian 
internal politics were much more important than Israel’s conventional or non-
conventional strength. Paul (1995), on the other hand, attributes this and other similar 
cases to the concept of “nuclear taboo,” the notion that nuclear weapons are 
characterized by their non-use. As Schelling (1994: 110) argues, the main reason for 
the uniqueness of nuclear weapons is the perception that they are unique and that once 
introduced into combat, they cannot be “contained, restrained, confined, or limited.” 
Given this “nuclear taboo,” Israel’s nuclear ability cannot guarantee that a limited war 
will not break out. Therefore, the influence of Israeli society’s deep polarizations on its 
willingness to enter into a conventional war is a central parameter in analyzing the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.    
 These polarizations, which cannot be hidden from neighboring countries, is a 
source of weakness for Israel’s position in the region. Israel’s leaders can indeed claim, 
as they often have, that they cannot proceed with the peace process due to internal 
opposition. But neighboring countries can also observe the strong opposition to a non-
consensual war. Domestic obstacles, therefore, can hardly be used to manipulate 
information in the bargaining process. We now discuss the effect of these obstacles on 
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. 
 
Israel’s Strategic Choices Relative to the Peace Process with 
the Palestinians in the Late 1990s 
 
 In this section, we analyze Israel’s strategic choices with regard to the peace 
process with the Palestinians in the late 1990s. Given the two-level game approach, we 
first explain the preferences of the two sides as they have been shaped until the late 
1990s. Based on these preferences, we outline the basic strategic choices open to Israeli 
leaders. We then expand the analysis to explain the bargaining mechanism preferred for 
Israel. 
 Applying the two-level game to the Palestinians, their position was influenced by 
international events such as the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
loss of superpower support by Syria and other Arab states, as well as the Palestinians’ 
own loss of support from the Gulf States following the 1991 war with Iraq. These 
events created the basic conditions for the Palestinians to move toward a cooperative 
strategy as expressed by the signing of the Oslo Agreement (Zartman, 1997). 
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 Yet, since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, dissatisfaction with the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has grown significantly among the Palestinian population 
(IISS, 1998: 146-148). As expressed in the Palestinians’ own observations, the 
economic situation in their autonomous regions deteriorated (Roy, 1995) and the Israeli 
government’s new policy since May 1996 has left the impression that their demands 
will not be met soon enough. As one military officer said, “When people are hungry, 
policy disintegrates” (Limor, 1998). As a result, they hardly trust Israel’s promises and 
commitments. This change in attitude, which mainly took place during 1996-1998, 
means that the Palestinians’ order of preference in the prisoners’ dilemma is as 
presented in Figure 2. They recognize the advantages of cooperation but believe they 
are playing a non-cooperative game with Israel, meaning that they prefer conflict (D-D) 
to the option of being the sole compromiser (D-C).     
 Because of the internal polarization discussed earlier, however, Israel has a 
different order of preference in its game with the Palestinians. This polarization means 
that Israeli society is divided in respect to the peace process. A significant right-wing 
segment of society actually views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of the 
prisoners’ dilemma described in Figure 2. Among them is a small “farther right” group 
of Israelis who, in line with the Figure 3 game, genuinely prefer mutual conflict with 
the Arabs to mutual cooperation. On the other hand, supporters of the peace process are 
more inclined toward cooperation with the Palestinians and clearly are not willing to 
pay the price of what they regard “a non-consensual war”. This means that their order 
of preference is similar to that in the Chicken game, where conflict is the worst 
outcome (Taylor, 1987). In a symmetrical Chicken game, there are two equilibria in 
pure strategies:  A player will cooperate if he/she believes the other will not cooperate, 
but will not cooperate if he/she believes the other will. 
 It follows that, given domestic conditions, Israeli leaders can adopt neither a 
conflictual approach toward the Palestinians nor a coherent peace strategy. All they can 
know with certainty is that a majority of the population supports some version of 
compromise, and that to those in favor of the peace process a violent conflict with the 
Palestinians constitutes the highest cost and therefore may also deepen the polarization, 
towards a total disintegration of Israeli society. On the other hand, right-wing parties 
and their supporters are split. Since most of them understand that the Oslo Agreement 
is irreversible (Sprinzak, 1998), they are willing to make some compromises, meaning 
that mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection. Thus, for them as well a 
violent conflict is ordered low in their preferences, while a reasonable compromise in 
their view can be accepted. This approach is expressed, for example, in the relatively 
low mass mobilization against compromises made by Netanyahu and Barak. In 
addition, in the May 1999 elections right-wing parties which strongly opposed any 
compromise in the peace process lost many seats in the parliament, and they now 
constitute only 7-10% of the seats. Overall, the hard core of strong opposition to the 
peace process is composed of religious settlers numbering about 50 thousand people. 
Although they constitute a strong interest group, they have gradually understood their 
power is limited. Furthermore, following the assassination of Itzhak Rabin in 1995 their 
modes of protest have modified significantly, and the intensity of their protest activities 
has declined  (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 1998a). This opposition may also use 
 Israel's Strategy toward Peace 56
 
 
party tactical/electoral/coalition calculations to bring about the government’s 
disintegration following a given move in the peace process. But these are stages in the 
adaptation of public attitudes to peace and of the division of political power in the 
parliament. Based on these indications, we argue that a clear majority of Israeli public 
and politicians recognize the need for compromises in negotiating with the Palestinians. 
This means that the long-term potential for societal disintegration as a result of 
concessions is lower than the disintegration potential as a result of conflict.  
 Thus, it is almost impossible to create a consensus for a conflictual strategy 
toward the Palestinians, while a reasonable consensus can be achieved over certain 
concessions. Therefore, the option of violent conflict is the worst possible outcome for 
Israeli leaders in their relations with the Palestinians. As explained in the previous 
section, the polarization in all dimensions converges; as a result politicians and 
observers have difficulty isolating the attitudes and motivations in each dimension 
separately. Yet, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders clearly observe the unwillingness of 
the Israeli public to pay the high price of violent conflict. They can both interpret the 
preference ordering of Israeli leaders as being similar to that of the Chicken game. 
Hence, due to domestic obstacles, Israeli leaders’ order of preference in their game 
with the Palestinians can be represented as follows: 
α = (D,C) > β = (C,C) > γ = (C,D) > δ = (D,D) 
The combination of the players’ order of preference leads to an asymmetric game as 
presented in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Asymmetric Power Relations between Israel and the Palestinians 
                  Palestinians 
                 C                D 
            C       β, β            γ, α  
                Israeli 
    Leaders D       α, δ            δ, γ  
 
 In this game, the Palestinians have a dominant strategy of non-cooperation. Israeli 
leaders, on the other hand, have an order of preference in the Chicken game, meaning 
they will cooperate if the Palestinians do not cooperate but will not cooperate if the 
Palestinians do. If Israeli leaders recognize the Palestinians’ order of preference, they 
can expect them to choose non-cooperation. Then the best possible strategy for Israeli 
leaders is cooperation, leading to a unique Nash equilibrium with pure strategies (γ,α).  
 This equilibrium outcome expresses the asymmetry between Israeli and 
Palestinian societies in terms of their willingness to tolerate the costs of a violent 
conflict. Since Israeli society is less willing than Palestinian society to bear such costs, 
it can be expected to achieve sub-optimal results as long as the non-cooperative game 
continues and the Palestinians are willing to enter into a violent conflict. Furthermore, 
this analysis implies that possible attempts by Israeli leaders to express an order of 
preference in the prisoners’ dilemma rather than recognizing the weaknesses of Israeli 
society may indeed lead to violent conflict, in which Israel will have no choice but to 
compromise under difficult conditions. Given the asymmetric game presented in Figure 
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4, the straightforward option for Israeli leaders is to influence the Palestinians’ order of 
preference in such a way that violent conflict will become the worst outcome for them 
as well. This means increasing the potential losses from a violent conflict by increasing 
its costs, as well as increasing the benefits from cooperation – i.e., accelerating the 
peace process rather than slowing it down. Alternatively, Israeli leaders may try to 
create a broad consensus in Israeli society with respect to the preferred strategy, 
whether a peaceful or conflictual one, toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 Moreover, since the Palestinian and Israeli communities are highly integrated, 
Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic obstacles to manipulate information in the 
bargaining process. They can claim, as they often have, that due to these obstacles they 
cannot proceed with the peace process, but the Palestinians can also see their 
difficulties in creating a consensus for a militarist policy. Therefore any attempt to 
manipulate information and create the impression that Israel has an order of preference 
in the prisoners’ dilemma is not likely to succeed. Rather, it may trap Israeli leaders in 
their own manipulation, thus creating a cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, 
Palestinian negotiators successfully use internal opposition to argue that they cannot 
make significant concessions. Yet if, as a result, Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorate 
to a violent conflict, Israeli leaders will have to compromise under difficult conditions 
as expected by the asymmetric game presented in Figure 4. 
 A more complex analysis of the game in Figure 4, however, enables us to draw 
practical conclusions about the preferred bargaining mechanism for Israel, as well as 
possible ways to influence the attitudes of the Israeli public through this mechanism. 
 The game in Figure 4 describes the core of the strategic dilemma that Israel is 
facing. Although the bargaining in the peace process is very complex, with many 
decision points on specific issues and many issues on the table, ultimately it can be 
reduced to several final decisions that will have to be made on key issues:  The size and 
location of territories to be under Palestinian rule, the Jerusalem problem, the refugees 
problem, division of water resources, border controls, and military limitations on the 
Palestinian state. We argue that given the conditions existing in the late 1990s, at each 
of these crucial decision points Israel is likely to face the strategic dilemma described 
in Figure 4. In other words, no matter how long the bargaining continues and whatever 
tactical moves the sides make, at the final point of decision the Palestinians are likely to 
adopt a conflictual approach in order to force Israel to make concessions. As long as 
this game continues, Israel is likely to make these concessions. 
 Furthermore, given the Israel public’s unwillingness to pay the price of conflict, 
dividing the peace process into many points of decision on small matters, such as the 
release of three or a dozen Palestinian prisoners, creates a situation in which the public 
sees a violent conflict over such points as unnecessary and therefore non-consensual 
conflict. Israeli leaders therefore make the concessions. Thus, by creating many 
decision points over small points, Israeli leaders actually create a situation where the 
asymmetric game presented in Figure 4 is played again and again but its outcome does 
not lead the Israeli public to change preferences. The concessions at each point seem 
too minor to justify a conflict and thus even when the game is repeated many times, the 
outcomes at one stage do not change the conditions for the next round. This cumulative 
effect led Israeli Prime Minister Barak, for example, to move from a willingness to give 
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the Palestinians 40% of the West Bank to a willingness to give 80-90%. This means 
that breaking the peace process issues into many decision points, both in terms of sub-
issues and in terms of time, creates a situation in which there is no difference between 
the meta-game and the one-stage game. Thus, Figure 4 can describe them both. 
 It directly follows that Israel has strong interest in immediately reaching the final 
decision points over the crucial issues in a sequential bargaining process. That is, the 
best strategy for Israeli leaders is to push for a time-constrained bargaining process 
seeking agreement on each crucial point individually rather than looking for a package 
deal covering all the issues. Then, if concessions on an isolated crucial point are 
followed by a conflictual approach by the Palestinians, the Israeli public can be 
expected to see a possible conflict over the next crucial issue as a consensual one. The 
model thus concludes that the bargaining mechanism should be composed of time 
constrained discussions on a key issue, implementation of the agreement on it, 
evaluation of the outcomes by both sides, followed then by another time constrained 
discussion on a key issue, implementation, evaluation, and so on. In this way, both the 
Palestinians and Israelis will have indications about the other’s intentions on the basis 
of specific actions, rather than subjective interpretations and beliefs.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have shown the impact of domestic processes on Israel’s 
strategy toward peace during the 1990s. Such processes intensify the polarization 
between different segments in Israeli society and limit the possibility that its leaders 
can create a consensus for any policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict – especially a 
consensus for violent conflict with the Palestinians. Since the Palestinians, as well as 
other Arab countries, observe these processes, Israeli leaders can hardly use domestic 
obstacles to manipulate information in the bargaining process. 
 Although the empirical setting analyzed in this paper is very complex, we believe 
that a theoretical game approach can help make the players’ choices very clear. 
Furthermore, by using games we are bounded by certain assumptions and terminology 
that make the analysis clear and well founded. For example, changes in bargaining 
position can be attributed to many factors. By specifying the players, their choices and 
the mutual dependence between them using simple, precise language, we can point out 
explanatory variables. In this respect, the two-level game analysis clearly helps explain 
the complex world of international relations. We believe it is very hard to generalize 
through formal models any hypothesis regarding the impact of a two-level interaction. 
Rather, we demonstrated how internal polarization may create an order of preferences 
in the Chicken game. Further research should proceed through a comparison of detailed 
case studies.       
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Abstract 
 
The concept of creative marginality refers to the process through which 
researchers in academic fields move away from the mainstream and toward the margins 
of their fields and look toward the margins of other fields that may overlap with and fill 
in gaps in their fields. This interaction, occurring outside of disciplinary boundaries, 
promotes intellectual cross-fertilization, and it is often the site of innovation. This 
article examines the links and interactions between the academic disciplines and 
practices of social work and conflict resolution. The article describes the different 
theoretical frames and practical approaches of both social work and conflict resolution, 
and discusses the ways in which these are parallel in both fields.  
Theorists and practitioners in social work and conflict resolution are engaged in 
debate around three key concepts related to self-determination, empowerment, and 
professional ethics. The newer and emerging frames of both fields are situated at 
parallel positions on the continuum of approaches to these key concepts, in their 
respective professions. These frames favor elicitive rather than prescriptive approaches 
and increased client or party self-determination, a focus on transformation and 
empowerment rather than on problem-solving alone, and a stance of engagement and 
advocacy towards intervention, rather than neutrality and impartiality. The authors 
argue that increased interchange between the two fields has the potential to contribute 
to the development of innovative approaches to transforming social conflicts and 
promoting positive social change. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Conflict is ubiquitous. It has been a major concern of every social science 
discipline, from political science to psychology, from economics to communications. 
Conflict and its resolution has also been a central feature of many professions, 
including law and diplomacy, management and social work. Working with conflict is 
often at the core of what social workers do. In fact, social workers are increasingly 
practicing conflict resolution as a profession (e.g. family and community mediation) or 
as an integral part of their social work practice. 
 In turn, the relatively new discipline of conflict resolution has drawn on every 
social science discipline, including political science, economics, sociology, 
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anthropology, and psychology. Conflict resolution practitioners have adopted 
approaches and techniques from many professions, including education, counseling and 
social work.  
 The link between social work and conflict resolution is an unequivocal one with 
numerous shared theories and methods underlying the practices of both fields. Both 
fields place an emphasis on people's interests, needs, values and identity. Both require 
collaborative processes. Much of the work in both fields involves addressing issues that 
affect children and families, communities, organizations, and the environment. Yet 
both fields, perhaps too readily, have tended to appropriate the vocabularies and 
techniques of the other, without thoroughly grasping the assumptions and concepts 
underpinning them. And despite the overlap, there has been little concentrated effort to 
include conflict resolution theory and practice as a fundamental component of social 
work education. Neither have conflict resolution academics nor practitioners made a 
conscious effort to identify the contributions that social work has made and can make 
to the field of conflict resolution. 
 Nevertheless, there are parallel theoretical currents that have implications for the 
practice of both fields. One is the problem-solving approach, which is currently the 
basis of social work practice, particularly in the context of managed care. The problem-
solving approach is also the basis of the predominant conflict management practice 
which is "interest-based bargaining" (Fisher and Ury, 1981).  
 Another is the transformative approach, the goals of which include personal 
change, changed relationships, and the empowerment of individuals or groups. This 
approach is characterized by a focus on collaborative processes and an emphasis on 
self-determination. The goal of transformative approaches is empowerment (Rothman, 
1997 and Bush and Folger, 1994).  
 Still another is the nested approach, which acknowledges - and sometimes 
attempts to address - the multiple layers of the system in which individuals are 
embedded (Dugan, 1996). Theorists and practitioners in both fields are struggling to 
define the roles of their fields in relation to the larger structural or systemic issues that 
are often the source of the problems that their practices are attempting to solve. This is 
sometimes played out in decisions about the appropriate systemic level at which to 
carry out interventions. 
 Both fields are impacted by the contradictions and tensions between the problem 
solving, transformative, and structural or systemic approaches. It is in grappling with 
these tensions, at the cutting edges of these fields, that a partnership between them 
holds the most promise. In both the academic and professional arenas, there is much to 
be gained from cross-fertilization between social work and conflict resolution. 
 
Creative Marginality 
 
 The concept of creative marginality was developed by Dogan and Pahre (1990), 
who suggest that each academic field develops its own theoretical knowledge base built 
on an accumulation of innovations (what they term "patrimony"), which grounds the 
research in that field. As disciplines grow and become dense with theorists, there is an 
overcrowding in the academic field with many scholars studying the same patrimony 
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and asking the same questions. Such density is not characterized by innovation. 
 Density simultaneously creates a propensity for researchers to fragment into sub 
fields. Specialization subsequently produces gaps between sub fields. As some scholars 
move away from the mainstream and toward the margins of the field, they begin to 
look toward the margins of other fields that may overlap and fill in those gaps. This 
interaction outside of disciplinary boundaries provides the grounds for intellectual 
cross-fertilization, and it is often the site at which innovation occurs. "Not only are the 
margins less densely populated, providing more room to grow, but successful 
combinations of material from two sub fields typically allows greater scope for 
creativity. In fact, the greatest accumulation of incremental advances takes place at the 
intersection of fields" (Dogan and Pahre, 1990). 
 This process has occurred in most fields of inquiry from anthropology to zoology. 
For example, the field of developmental psychology, in attempting to fill in the gap 
between psychological development and biological development, has become an 
important field in its own right (Dogan and Pahre, 1990). The cross-fertilization of 
theories and practices between the fields of conflict resolution and social work 
promises not only the possibility of innovation at the site at which their margins 
overlap, but also the possibility of producing a hybrid sub field. In anticipation of this 
innovation, it is important to explore how conflict resolution can inform the theory and 
practice of social work and how social work can inform the theory and practice of 
conflict resolution.  
 
Intervention in Conflict Resolution and Social Work:  
Mediation as a Crossroad 
 
 There are numerous examples that illustrate the synthesis between social work and 
conflict resolution in the practices of both fields. This is most pronounced in the arena 
of mediation. There are many people practicing mediation today and they come from a 
wide range of experience and training, including lawyers, conflict resolution 
professionals and community volunteers. Social workers are increasingly including 
mediation in their "toolbox" of interventions. These include divorce and custody 
mediation, mediating intercultural conflicts, mediating community conflicts, crime 
victim-offender mediation, Equal Employment Opportunity disputes, and health care 
conflicts (between health care providers, patients, and insurance companies). Of these, 
divorce and custody mediation is perhaps the most widely practiced type of mediation 
by social workers. 
 Social workers began providing divorce mediation services in the United States in 
the 1960's, and within two decades were providing almost half of the mediation 
services in the private sector, and almost three quarters of the services in the public 
sector (Pearson, Ring and Milne, 1983). The divorce mediator facilitates negotiations 
between spouses attempting to reach a divorce settlement. Unlike the traditional 
divorce litigation process, a key characteristic of divorce mediation is the emphasis on 
ensuring that both parties' issues are voiced and acknowledged, leading to recognition 
and acceptance of mutual responsibility for the relationship's outcome (Haynes, 1978).  
Mediation is compatible with social work practice because its goal is to help 
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parties solve their own problems and to empower people in conflict. Mediation builds 
on social work skills, such as problem analysis, communication, and systems 
intervention. However, mediation is not just another application of core social work 
skills. It draws on many other professional disciplines as well, including sociology, 
political science, law and organizational development (Mayer, 1995). 
While conflict resolution is not psychotherapy, and mediation is not a 
therapeutic technique, it is a technique that may have considerable therapeutic benefit. 
Kelly (1983) points out that there are similarities in the goals, techniques and outcomes 
of psychotherapy and mediation, in the context of divorce mediation; however he 
insists that the two must be seen as distinct professions. 
It is important to recognize that the effect of a successfully completed 
mediation on one or both clients can be similar to the effect hoped for in therapy. For 
example, the divorce mediation process is often highly therapeutic for one or both 
parties since it can lead to an observable reduction in the anxiety, depression, and anger 
that can be generated by divorce. Similarly, mediators sometimes note increased 
acceptance of the divorce, increased confidence in one's ability to cope, heightened 
self-reliance, and improved communications between divorcing spouses. However 
positive these changes may be, they are not usually the primary goal of mediation, but 
rather the effect of the process. In fact, mediation can produce a divorce settlement 
satisfactory to both parties without any accompanying psychological change (Kelly, 
1983). 
 Problem-solving mediation may employ some of the same techniques as therapy 
but the mediator is focused on how to reach an agreement by which the parties will 
abide in the future. Its goal is not to examine past pain or negative patterns of 
interaction. "Mediation has long been distinguished from therapy by its settlement 
goals, task focus, and highly structured format. The psychological and emotional 
benefits accrued from mediation have usually been considered secondary goals or by-
products of a cooperative process" (Gold, 1997). 
 The role of the problem-solving mediator is more directive than that of the 
therapist; the mediator may structure the process, suggest options, educate, organize 
information and assist the parties to develop proposals. Assessment is limited since 
mediation does not generally probe deeply into past history. Intervention may include 
social work techniques as well as aspects of law, conflict management, and negotiation 
and bargaining strategies and tactics (Kruk, 1997). 
 However, as both conflict resolution and social work move away from interest-
based problem-solving goals, and towards needs- and identity-based empowerment and 
transformative goals, their borders become increasingly blurred. Current mediation 
practice can be seen as falling along a continuum from "structured to therapeutic, 
neutralist to interventionist, directive to nondirective" (Kruk, 1997, p. 11) depending on 
the mediator, the parties, and the nature of the conflict. Some conflicts, such as those 
involving child custody, require more intervention on the part of the mediator.  
 If the goal of mediation is to facilitate the process of divorce in a way that can 
ensure continued and effective nurturing and sustenance of a child, then mediation 
must be integrated into a wider spectrum of educational, psychological, legal, and 
community services for the divorcing family. As Wallerstein (1986) writes, "Family 
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mediation has outgrown its origins and emerged as a social intervention that takes us to 
a new threshold in conflict resolution. A dignified and dignifying method of decision 
making, it affirms that the process by which people arrive at a decision is related to the 
efficacy of that decision. This is perhaps the single most revolutionary idea regarding 
mediation that we must grasp". 
 Social work and human service scholars have promoted several therapeutic 
approaches to mediation. Irving and Benjamin (1987) present a four-stage therapeutic 
family mediation approach, as an alternative to structured negotiation in family 
mediation. Kruk's (1997) therapeutic-interventionist approach is suggested for 
facilitating parenting plans after a divorce. In this approach, the mediator takes on an 
advocacy role for the children's needs. Johnston and Campbell's (1988) tri-level model 
of high conflict mediation proposes that mediation and counseling may sometimes be 
provided by the same professional. In these models, "the primary focus of mediation is 
the underlying emotional issues and relational processes blocking agreement, and the 
goal of mediation is not only settlement of the dispute, but restructured relationships, 
enhanced communication and problem-solving skills, and increased cooperation or at 
least reduction of conflict between and among the parties" (Kruk, 1997). These forms 
of mediation, which are informed by a social work/human services perspective, 
incorporate elements of therapy into mediation practice. 
 As conflict resolution practitioners increasingly utilize techniques that expand the 
borders of their field beyond mediation, and as social workers increasingly employ 
practices that expand the borders of their field beyond psychotherapy, the boundaries 
between the two professions become even more blurred. For example, a relatively 
recent innovation in which both conflict professionals and social workers are involved 
is the victim-offender reconciliation program (VORP), which is based on the concept 
of restorative justice (Severson and Bankston, 1995). The aim of a VORP is to provide 
an alternative to the judicial process that will enable a crime victim and an offender to 
work together towards a settlement that promotes reconciliation between them 
(Umbreit, 1993). The offender (generally having been convicted of burglary or theft) is 
normally referred to a mediator by the court. The mediator arranges a joint meeting 
between the victim and the offender, at which the victim communicates their feelings 
about the crime and their sense of victimization. The offender is given the opportunity 
to explain the circumstances that led to the committing of the crime. Both parties then 
work together to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement, which could be monetary 
compensation, community service, or some other form of restitution (Umbreit, 1993). 
In a VORP, social workers and conflict resolution practitioners, may be involved not 
only as mediators, but also as trainers, organizers and program developers (Umbreit, 
1993). 
 It is important to note that although mediation is perhaps the most widely known 
and practiced conflict resolution intervention, new approaches are being developed. 
These approaches include: focusing on  conflict prevention, providing procedural, 
substantive, or decision making assistance to parties, peacebuilding and reconciliation, 
and dispute system design (Mayer, 2000). These new approaches aim to address the 
limitations of  mediation and continue to contribute to the growth of the field of 
conflict resolution.  
 Conflict Resolution and Social Work 68
 
 
 
From the Center to the Margins of Conflict Resolution: Resources, Interests, 
Identities, and Structures 
 
  Conflict theory can be organized in terms of "frames," signifying that each of 
these perspectives provides a lens to the world of conflict. Frames set phenomena 
within a conceptual and cognitive context that delineates their components and imposes 
upon them a particular organization and meaning (Bateson, 1972; Schon and Rein, 
1994). Frames focus the attention of both theorists and practitioners on particular 
aspects of the conflict situation, shape the definition of the problem, and guide conflict 
intervention (Bolman and Deal, 1984; Friedman and Lipshitz, 1994). Frames may also 
be limiting and lead to selective perception (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). For the 
purpose of this paper, the dominant and emerging (and still somewhat peripheral) 
frames in the field of conflict resolution, will be categorized into four major "frames", 
which will be referred to as the resource frame, the interests frame, the identity frame, 
and the structural frame.  
 
The resource frame 
 
 The "resource" frame views conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to 
scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, 
injure, or eliminate rivals" (Coser, 1967). This definition reflects the current 
predominant Western approach to conflict  (Hocker and Wilmot, 1995). From the 
perspective of the resource frame, human existence is seen as a competitive process in 
which conflict may be contained or ameliorated but never eliminated.  
 According to the resource frame, conflict is the natural outcome of competition 
among individuals and groups over material goods, economic resources, and political 
power. The natural tendency towards aggression must be contained by the creation of 
coercive or legal frameworks, and by a "social contract" which can forge a functioning 
society based on the alignment of individual and group interests. The resource frame 
draws on the perspective of sociologists such as Parsons (1960), who regard 
"equilibrium" or stability as an indication of a healthy society. 
 Within the resource frame, the alternatives to violence for settling conflicts are 
either mechanisms for social control or bargaining and negotiation processes. The 
resource frame focuses on each side gaining control of the bargaining or negotiation 
situation in order to "maximize" its desired outcome. Compromise is viewed as an 
acceptable outcome when total domination is viewed as unnecessary or impossible to 
win or to sustain. From the perspective of the resource frame, reaching an agreement in 
which resources have been redistributed to the satisfaction of all sides means that the 
conflict has been resolved.  
 A criticism of the resource frame is that it leads to interventions that emphasize 
short-term, material solutions that leave the underlying causes of the conflict 
untouched. As a result, intractable conflicts, whose sources are structural, tend to recur 
with added intensity. Each time a conflict recurs it may become increasingly 
entrenched and the cost of its resolution may become higher and higher. Moreover, to 
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the extent that the underlying causes remain unaddressed, the resource based framing 
may leave deeper problems ignored until they explode as a full-blown crisis.  
 
The interests frame 
 
 To date, an “interests” frame of conflict has dominated the field of conflict 
management. It was popularized by Fisher and Ury, in their book Getting to Yes 
(1981), and by others in the fields of international diplomacy, law, environmental 
mediation, and community relations (Carrbonneau, 1989; Goldberg, Green and Sander, 
1985; Raifa, 1982   Rubin and Brown, 1975; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). These 
approaches reject the view of conflict as a zero-sum competition over scarce resources 
and power, even though conflicts may appear to hinge upon incompatible demands for 
power, territory or material resources.  
 Fisher and Ury (1981) suggest that such demands, or bargaining positions, are 
simply concrete expressions of underlying interests, which they define as "needs, 
desires, concerns, and fears". The interests approach maintains that parties to a conflict 
often become fixated on their bargaining positions and lose sight of their genuine 
interests. Rather than haggling over ways to divide limited resources, parties explore 
ways in which their interests can be linked through "integrative" bargaining rather than 
domination or compromise (Follett, 1942).  
 The interests frame, with its more optimistic view of conflict, is strongly reflected 
in intervention theories that focus on "managing" conflict (Blake, Shepard, and 
Mouton, 1964; Likert and Likert, 1976; Thomas, 1976; Tjosvold, 1991; Walton, 1987; 
Walton and McKersie, 1966). Conflict management implies that certain levels of 
conflict are necessary and functional. Unlike the resource frame, which sees conflict 
intervention as primarily a negotiation process, conflict management reflects the 
interests frame's emphasis on problem solving and developing good relationships 
(Rahim, 1986; Thomas, 1976; Walton, 1987). Conflict management shares the resource 
frame's emphasis on bargaining strategies and tactics, but with a strong emphasis on 
replacing competitive strategies with cooperative or collaborative ones and on 
producing "win/win" outcomes (Axelrod, 1984; Deutsch, 1973, 1994; Walton, 1987). 
 Smith (1987) pointed out that some interventionists associated with the interests 
frame see themselves as agents of social change. However, by focusing primarily on 
agreements and fostering improved working relationships, they may actually reinforce 
the status quo of the system even though they espouse system change. Because of its 
emphasis on controlling conflict and promoting collaborative strategies, conflict 
management lends itself to "single loop learning," which focuses on changing 
individual and group behavior while leaving the underlying goals, values and norms 
unchanged. As a result, the interests frame may be of limited help, or even be 
counterproductive, in producing "double-loop learning," which involves critical inquiry 
into, and changes in, underlying goals, values, and norms (Argyris and Schon, 1996). 
As with the resource frame, the interests frame's focus on solutions may leave the 
sources of the conflict undiscussed and undiscussible. Even when it appears to be 
successful, conflict management can lead to an illusion of resolution. If the underlying 
problems are not fully addressed, the deeper conflicts will continue to resurface again 
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and again (around different issues, perhaps) leading to greater distrust, cynicism, and 
hopelessness. 
 
The identity frame  
 
 The "identity" frame of conflict is a newer frame that has been incorporated into 
the field of conflict resolution. This frame also sees conflict as stemming from needs, 
desires, concerns, and fears. However, it suggests that intractable conflicts are really 
about the articulation and confrontation of individual and collective identities 
(Rothman, 1997). These conflicts may be expressed and negotiated in terms of 
resources or interests, but they really involve people's individual and collective goals, 
sense of meaning, and definitions of self. According to the identity frame, conflicts are 
rooted in threats to or frustration of fundamental human needs, such as those for 
dignity, recognition, safety, control, purpose, and efficacy (Burton, 1990 and Azar, 
1990).  
 The identity frame differs from the other two frames by rejecting the notion that 
conflicts are problems to be resolved or even managed. While acknowledging the 
destructive potential of conflict, this frame maintains that conflict offers opportunities 
for growth, adaptation, and learning  (Bush and Folger, 1994;  Lederach, 1995;  
Rupesinghe, 1995). This approach, also known as the "interactive problem-solving 
approach," views conflict as a result of threatened or frustrated needs which must be 
surfaced, fully analyzed and addressed, before any kind of bargaining or negotiation 
can succeed (Azar, 1990;  Burton, 1990;  Kelman, 1982;  Fisher, 1996; Rothman, 
1992). 
 Gurevitch (1989) suggests that true dialogue and learning occurs when disputants 
learn how to "not understand" each other instead of continually imposing their own 
mental models on the other. This studied unknowing involves fundamentally 
questioning the way in which individuals and groups have constructed the reality which 
they share (akin to the process of double loop learning). On the one hand, it can lead to 
mutually defined perceptions of reality. On the other hand, it can increase the 
possibility that both sides gain deeper insight about themselves. From this perspective, 
the desired outcome of conflict is not just resolution, but also growth, moral 
development, and fundamental changes in perception.   
 The identity frame focuses on the process of engaging conflict rather than simply 
reaching a particular settlement. Conflict engagement means creating "reflexive 
dialogue" in which parties speak about their needs and interests in the presence of their 
adversaries (Rothman, 1997). It also aims explicitly at change both within individual 
parties and between parties. Having first  expressed themselves and heard each other in 
this way, parties are encouraged to collaborate in setting new goals and restructuring 
their relationship on the basis of changes in, and more positive definitions of, 
themselves. 
 Rather than focusing on resolving conflicting interests, the identity-frame provides 
a way of thinking about conflict as an opportunity for double-loop learning, or inquiry 
into and clarification of deeper issues involving fundamental goals, values, needs, 
standards, and assumptions (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Unlike the resource or interests 
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frames of conflict, the identity frame does not focus on bargaining or negotiation as a 
means of intervening in or resolving conflict. From the perspective of the identity 
frame, the goal of intervention is not just reaching agreements or resolution. Rather it 
entails engaging conflict as an opportunity for challenging the status quo. From the 
identity frame perspective, conflict promotes what Argyris and Schon (1978) have 
called "good dialectic." Agreements emerge not through changing strategies from 
competition to cooperation but as the result of inquiry and fundamental changes in 
thinking. By asking parties in a conflict to consider the meaning behind their needs and 
interests, the identity frame offers an approach to conflict and conflict engagement that 
can be empowering and transformative. 
 
The structural frame 
 
 An emerging frame in the field of conflict resolution is the structural frame. This 
frame has its roots in the work of Johan Galtung (1969) and the field of peace studies. 
Galtung (1969) developed the concept of "structural violence" as the situation of 
political, economic, and social injustice in which gross inequities exist between 
different groups' decision-making power over the distribution of resources (Galtung, 
1969).   
 Maire Dugan (1996), another peace researcher, developed the "nested theory" to 
delineate how a given interpersonal, familial, or organizational conflict is symptomatic 
of over-arching societal systems and structures. On the one hand, traditional conflict 
resolution practice addresses an immediate crisis, and may even help to repair or renew 
the relationship between conflicting parties; however, it does not redress the 
inequalities of the system that is at the root of the conflict. On the other hand, peace 
research focuses on the structural and systemic level, but does not resolve the conflict 
at hand, or mend the relationship. Dugan suggests an intermediate level, which she 
calls the sub-system, as the arena in which practitioners can simultaneously address the 
conflict at hand, the relationship, and the larger system. 
 Conflict theorists employing the structural frame propose that changes in both 
relationships and structures or systems are necessary for genuine conflict 
transformation to occur. Jeong (1999) writes, "Efforts to resolve conflict need to be 
assessed in terms of an outcome as well as a process. Subsequently, conflict resolution 
has to be geared toward finding solutions to the structural causes of problems that are 
responsible for contentious relationships.... Negotiation for peaceful relationships 
would not be effective without confronting the structural origins of problems". 
 Richard Rubenstein (1999) points out that interveners are regularly successful in 
their efforts to assist parties in restructuring systems or patterned relationships in 
organizations and families. "To the extent that the family functions as an independent 
social unit, this task may be accomplished without great difficulty by skillful third 
parties" (Rubenstein, 1999). But families, organizations, schools, and other social units, 
are not independent units. Rubenstein (1999) continues, "....their embeddedness in 
modern social structures makes it increasingly difficult for them to play traditional 
roles as institutional alternatives to the macro-system. As a result, one increasingly 
finds family conflicts linked with broader structural conflicts. Their termination may 
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therefore be dependent upon conflict resolution at a more encompassing and 
problematical level". 
  Traditional conflict resolution practice, because it brings the parties to 
settlement without addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, may result in 
temporary peace. However, the failure to restructure in significant and fundamental 
ways, almost guarantees that conflict will recur (Rubenstein,1999). 
 
From the Center to the Margins of Social Work: Psychotherapies,  
Strengths and Ecosystems 
 
Social work theories, too, can be organized in terms of "frames," or 
perspectives that provide a lens to social problems. The social work profession, already 
a century old, is clearly much older than the profession of conflict resolution. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap between many of the assumptions, concepts 
and approaches of the newest and emerging approaches of conflict resolution and social 
work.   
 
The psychotherapy frame 
 
 Social work is rooted in the nineteenth-century concept of casework, which 
focused on a diagnosis and treatment model of social work practice (James, 1987). For 
the past seventy years, social work has been dominated by the assumption that 
individualized psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and humanistic psychology are appropriate 
means for dealing with social problems (Specht, 1994). "We have these perceptions of 
social treatments because, as Americans, our belief in the individual's capacity for 
change is strong, and our faith in the power of the group and the community is weak, 
evidence to the contrary notwithstanding." (Specht, 1994.) 
 In this frame, social work is primarily a problem-solving approach, as both the 
individual and society strive for self-fulfillment (Compton and Galaway, 1994). What 
distinguishes different theories and practices of social work often depends on the 
answer to the question: With whom does responsibility for change rest? Is it the social 
worker or the client?  James (1987) suggests that there is a continuum along which the 
different theories and practices of social work answer that question.  
 The psychosocial approach to casework (Woods and Hollis, 1990) emphasizes the 
importance of assessment and diagnosis and the social worker's efforts to determine the 
client's needs. Perlman's (1970) problem-solving model places more emphasis on the 
client's ownership of the problem, but still suggests "the problem-to-be-worked may 
become that of helping the client move from his interpretation of the problem to that of 
the caseworker". Ruth Smalley's functional approach (1970) works from a psychology 
of growth, with the center of change in the client. 
 Crisis intervention assumes that the client's normal problem-solving mechanisms 
may not be functioning effectively and that the social worker may have to take an 
active role in owning and defining the client's problem. Behavior modification, based 
on learning theory, allows the client to retain ownership of the problem, while the 
social worker takes on the role of expert. Task-centered casework, which is particularly 
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applicable for short-term treatment, encourages social workers to assist clients in 
achieving specific and limited goals of their choice. The social worker assists the client 
to list and rank order problems and to develop means to work on them, at which point, 
the social worker's role is to monitor the client's progress (James, 1987). 
 More recently, feminist-informed, culturally sensitive, and humanistic approaches 
to social work back away from the social worker as expert and focus on client-directed 
definitions of problems. On the margins of social work today are even more subjective 
approaches, such as narrative, constructivist, and post-modern theories, which posit that 
reality is not objectively determined, but is subjectively constructed and contextualized. 
These theories refocus the emphasis of social work practice on process rather than 
outcome, with the stress on shaping inquiry into the clients' definitions of their 
problems, rather than on diagnosis. Ironically, this trend is emerging as managed health 
care demands an increasing focus on problem solving with measurable outcomes.  
   
The strengths frame  
 
 The strengths frame has developed in part as a response to the pathology frame. 
"Some of the impetus for the development of a strengths/resilience-based practice 
comes from our society's unabashed fascination with pathology, problems, moral and 
interpersonal aberrations, violence, and victimization. Add to that the unstinting effort 
to medicalize and pathologize almost every human behavior pattern, habit, and trait, 
and you have a heady mix of diagnoses, labels, and identities at the ready - all 
advertising our abnormalities, disorders, weaknesses, fallibilities, and 
victimization."(Saleebey, 1999.) 
 The strengths frame suggests a more balanced view of the power of individuals to 
overcome problems and produce change. This frame is characterized by "words such as 
empowerment, membership, competence, potential, responsibility, growth, assets, and 
visions" (Saleebey, 1999), which contrast with the vocabulary of the medical and 
psychotherapeutic approaches.  
 The role of the intervener includes facilitating clients to recognize and build upon 
their assets, strengths, and resources in their environment, to recognize their options 
and alternatives, and to design strategies that support and strengthen ethnic 
backgrounds. Intervener roles also include educating clients and assisting them to 
increase their own skills, encouraging clients to believe in their ability to change, and 
encouraging clients to assume an optimistic perspective about life's possibilities 
(Saleebey, 1999). 
  Problems, viewed by theorists and practitioners operating from the strengths 
frame, are opportunities for growth and change. Individuals are viewed as having 
unlimited capabilities for growth and change, and environments are viewed as being 
full of assets and resources. Proponents of the strengths frame have criticized the 
problem-solving approach in social work because the concentration on problems moves 
the focus away from client strengths. Compton and Galaway counter that, "While 
problems in the person-situation interaction are the basis for the initial engagement 
between client and worker, the ensuing formulation and implementation of solutions 
calls upon client strengths, strengths in the environment, and worker strengths." 
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(Saleebey, 1999.)  
  
The ecosystem frame 
 
 The ecosystem frame emphasizes the relationships or interactions between 
individuals and their social environments. It assumes that these interactions are 
reciprocal, and that individuals and environments are continually shaping each other 
(Germain and Gitterman, 1980). This dual emphasis on the individual and the 
environment is an important characteristic of this social work frame and distinguishes it 
from the psychotherapy frame and the psychotherapeutic professions.  
 The ecosystem frame also attempts to counter the disease or pathology orientation 
of the psychotherapeutic approaches to social work. Rather, this frame focuses on the 
role performance of individuals and the environmental supports that are available to 
them. "According to this approach, individuals experience problems when there is a 
poor fit between their needs and wants, and the resources made available by their 
environment - in particular, the community" (Compton and Galaway, 1999).  
 Because people and their environments are treated as a single concept, the 
ecosystem frame requires that interventions be addressed together, and that approaches 
to practice integrate the treatment and reform traditions of social work. Social work 
interventions occur at the interface between the individual and the environment, or at 
the problems generated by the "person-in-situation" interaction. Practice entails three 
objectives: facilitating interaction between individuals and their social environment, 
assisting individuals to increase their problem-solving skills and their competence, and 
influencing social and environmental policy(Compton and Galaway, 1999).  
 This frame's answer to a long-standing question within the social work profession 
about whether to focus on individual change or environmental change is that the 
profession should focus not on one or the other, but on the interaction between the 
individual and the environment. Consequently, the practice of social workers 
employing this approach integrates both clinical and social interventions. Because 
interactions between individuals and their environments are contextual, social workers 
must have skills to promote both individual and/or social change depending on the 
circumstances.  
 Another long-standing question within the field of social work relates to whether 
the profession should focus on rehabilitation or whether it should focus on prevention. 
Again, the ecosystems frame suggests an answer. "Prevention is seen as requiring 
social change, while rehabilitation is perceived as helping individuals to cope with 
immediate situations. In reality, all social work is both preventive and rehabilitative." 
(Compton and Galaway, 1999.) 
 
Overlapping Concepts in Conflict Resolution and Social Work 
 
 Conflict resolution and social work are engaged in similar controversies related to 
three concepts that the two fields hold in common: self-determination, empowerment, 
and professional ethics. Concepts, according to Dogan and Pahre (1990), are developed 
and given a specific meaning by a discipline, and play an important role in bridging 
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between disciplines. "Because scholars are socialized into a specific discipline, most of 
us labor under various kinds of conceptual blinders, which vary from one discipline to 
the next. By putting on the conceptual blinders of another discipline in order to 
examine one's own, or by looking at a discipline from outside, without these blinders, 
one has a greater opportunity to innovate." (Dogan and Pahre, 1990.) 
 Each of these concepts encompasses a continuum of approaches to intervention: 
prescriptive versus elicitive intervention, problem solving versus transformation goals, 
and third party neutrality/impartiality versus advocacy of intervener roles. "Not only 
are the theory and skill sets of mediation [and conflict resolution more generally] and 
generalist social work practice highly compatible, but each embraces a set of core 
values to which practitioners are expected to adhere, including client self-
determination, empowerment, and professional competence." (Kruk, 1997.)  
 
Self-determination: Prescriptive versus Elicitive Intervention 
 
 Mayer (1995) suggests a continuum of intervener and client participation in the 
resolution of conflict and highlights four points along that continuum: unassisted 
procedures, nonbinding assistance, binding assistance and designing a dispute system. 
The unassisted procedures can include negotiation, conciliation, rapport building, 
information exchange, and collaborative problem solving and decision making. Social 
workers can act as coaches or teachers for clients who may be conducting their own 
negotiations; and in non-binding assistance procedures, social workers can act as 
intermediaries. Generally, social workers do not act as formal arbitrators; however, in 
the case of child custody evaluation, social workers' decisions may be authorized as 
binding by the court. The most common type of conflict resolution techniques used by 
social workers, and increasingly conflict resolution professionals working in the newer 
identity-frames, are the unassisted, facilitative, or non-binding procedures.  
 The debate between prescriptive versus elicitive intervention centers around the 
degree of authority exercised by the intervener. The more traditional frames and 
approaches of both fields assume a more prescriptive intervener role. In these 
approaches, the social worker or conflict resolution practitioner is the "expert" and is 
likely to prescribe or have substantial influence over the direction of the intervention 
and the parameters of possible solutions to the problems.  
 The newer approaches of both social work and conflict resolution emphasize 
increased client self-determination. Both seek to foster maximum client control over 
intervention processes and ownership of the problems. The approaches of the newer 
frames are more elicitive and demand the active participation of the clients in defining 
problems and developing alternative solutions. The role of the intervener is that of 
facilitator or guide, who works collaboratively with clients through these processes. 
  The field of conflict resolution practice incorporates an ever-growing number of 
applied practices, including mediation, facilitation, and arbitration. Mediation, 
however, is the best known and most widely practiced. There are a variety of mediation 
practitioners, including peer mediators in schools, volunteer mediators in community 
centers, court-appointed mediators and divorce and family mediators. One 
characteristic that differentiates types of mediation is the degree of the parties' decision 
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making power involved at each step of the process, beginning with whether 
participation by the parties is voluntary or involuntary.  
A mediator who views conflict and conflict resolution through the identity 
frame, and who views the goals of mediation as transformation, will generally be more 
likely to promote the parties' self-determination in defining the problem and proposing 
solutions. These mediators generally employ the same elicitive techniques that social 
workers do, including attending and focusing, questioning, reframing, partializing, 
summarizing, and reflecting (Kruk, 1997). James (1987) outlines other skills that are 
important in mediation: identifying and defining issues, encouraging parties to share 
their perceptions of these issues, exploring options available to the parties, managing 
conflict between the parties, and helping them negotiate towards their own solutions. 
"Such processes and skills underline the emphasis upon client control of the 
proceedings and the outcome, and their continued 'ownership' of the conflict." (James, 
1987.).  
 
Empowerment: Problem-Solving versus Transformation 
 
 Power can be viewed as oppressive and destructive, when viewed as the ability of 
one person to influence the decisions and behaviors of another. Yet power can also be 
seen as positive, for example, as in the ability to get things done (Yanoov, 1996). 
 The problem social workers must face in conflict resolution situations is how to 
promote the constructive application of power and how to ensure that disempowered 
parties gain access to available legitimate sources of power. It is not so much that a 
balance of power must be achieved, because such a balance is an elusive goal that an 
intervener usually cannot attain. Instead, it is important that the parties to a conflict be 
helped to obtain access to information, advocates, resources, and support systems, so 
they can be effective in mobilizing and bringing to bear the legitimate sources of power 
that are available to them (Mayer, 1995).  
 "At the community level, many of the social problems which concern community 
workers can be analyzed as the product of actual imbalances of power" (Yanoov, 
1996). Viewed in these terms it is not difficult to understand why many community 
conflicts, in which problem-solving interventions alone are employed, are recurring. 
For example, if conflicts between communities are framed as legal problems, then 
solutions will be sought through law enforcement efforts. Unless a transformation in 
people's attitudes and behaviors and relationships occurs, the underlying causes of the 
conflict may persist or worsen. However, viewing the conflict through the identity 
frame to identify underlying causes, and utilizing transformative intervention 
approaches, may produce empowerment and changes in the balance of power. In such a 
situation, conflict can be embraced as an opportunity for power redistribution in the 
community.  
 For example, gender-based power imbalances are the driving force behind a 
feminist approach to conflict resolution. The feminist-informed goal of mediation 
might be twofold: both a fair and equitable settlement of the dispute and empowerment 
of the disadvantaged party (usually the woman). This approach to mediation is highly 
interventionist, since it views mediator neutrality as dangerous to the disadvantaged 
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party. The mediator will likely intervene in both process and outcome to assure the 
empowerment of the disadvantaged party (Kruk, 1997). 
 A central controversy in the field of conflict resolution, between problem-solving 
and transformative approaches, revolves around the issue of empowerment. Bush and 
Folger (1994) suggest that empowerment, rather than problem-solving, should be the 
goal of mediation. "At the simplest level, problem-solving mediation defines the 
objective as improving the parties' situation from what it was before. The 
transformative approach instead defines the objective as improving the parties 
themselves from what they were before....transformative mediation is successful when 
the parties experience growth in both dimensions of moral development....developing 
both the capacity for strength of self and the capacity for relating to others. These are 
the objectives of empowerment and recognition" (Bush and Folger, 1994.) 
 
Professional Ethics: Third Party Neutrality/Impartiality versus 
Advocacy/Engagement 
 
 Social workers and conflict resolution practitioners bring to their professions 
specific skills and competencies, many of which are parallel. Communication skills and 
problem-solving skills are among them. Neutrality can be considered a professional 
skill, but its value is being questioned increasingly in both fields.  
 A principal debate in the field of conflict resolution concerns whether or not the 
intervener should remain neutral and impartial or engage in the conflict resolution 
process. In traditional resource-based and interest-based bargaining, the intervener is 
likely to adopt a stance of neutrality and impartiality. However identity-based 
interveners are more likely to adopt a stance of engagement. Increasingly, the concepts 
of neutrality and impartiality have come to be considered by proponents of 
transformative approaches as unrealistic, if not impossible, and as undesirable, if not 
dangerous (Bush and Folger, 1994).  
 This line of thinking posits that no practitioner can be neutral or impartial, because 
all interveners bring their own assumptions, beliefs, values, and expectations, that 
consciously or unconsciously, frame the very questions that they ask. The intervention, 
through the interaction between the intervener and the conflicting parties, creates a 
particular reality that is based on their combined beliefs and preconceived notions 
about conflict and conflict resolution. Thus the intervention itself, contributes to 
shaping the conflict and its outcome. "There is no such thing as the "parties' conflict" 
when third parties are involved. Conflicts are inevitably changed as they are processed, 
and mediators are an inevitable part of that change." (Bush and Folger, 1994.)  
 One way to frame the concepts of neutrality and impartiality may be as 
"disciplined bias," in which the intervener becomes self-conscious about his/her own 
beliefs and expectations and engages in self-conscious practice (Soros, 1987). Another 
way to frame these concepts may be as "reflection in action", developed by Donald 
Schon in The Reflective Practitioner (1983). Schon suggests that practitioners may 
improve their practice by focusing on how their roles and actions might influence the 
course of events. 
 A step beyond reflection, which concentrates on the role of the practitioner, is 
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reflexivity (Rothman, 1997), which focuses on the complex interplay between 
practitioner, client and context. Reflexivity suggests a process by which instinctive and 
unexamined reactions to external stimulus are delayed and analyzed prior to responding 
(Steier, 1991). This process of slowing down and analyzing the values and priorities 
inherent in the interaction process, while it is happening, is an interactive process 
which constantly considers self, other, and context, and encourages parties in conflict 
to examine their own underlying assumptions and priorities in their interactions. This is 
important, not only to the parties in conflict, but to the intervener as well. 
  Peile (1993) suggests ways in which social workers might avoid deterministic 
outcomes and promote creativity. He encourages social workers to view their own and 
clients' behavior as creative, and to encourage clients to view themselves in a creative 
relationship with their environment. The client and the social worker should relate to 
each other in ways that recognize each other's creative potential. The social worker 
should explicitly model this process by working through new ideas out loud, and by 
using different methods of seeking solutions, both verbal and nonverbal. He further 
suggests that social workers avoid rushing, and allow time for handling frustration and 
tension. The social worker may join with the client in collaborative reflection, and 
affirm and strengthen the creative initiative shown by the client, including action, 
reflection and experimentation (Peile, 1993). 
 The ethics of professional practice necessitate that social workers be keenly aware 
of their values and how they convey them through professional language and behavior. 
Manning (1997) suggests that social workers need to be aware of ethical issues, 
determine what is morally necessary, and transform their moral beliefs and values into 
action. "Social workers who have the 'courage to be as oneself' and to engage in the 
public debate about contemporary social transformations, integrate social work values 
into the public dialogue, and ultimately shape culture. Moral citizenship - awareness, 
thinking, feeling, and action - provides a framework for this transformational practice." 
(Manning, 1997.) 
  
Conclusion 
 
 There are clearly many shared theoretical and applied approaches between the 
fields of social work and conflict resolution, and much to be gained from a sustained 
dialogue between both theorists and practitioners in the two fields. Such a dialogue has 
the potential to significantly enhance the practice of both professions, especially in 
relation to those practices, such as mediation and psychotherapy, in which the borders 
between the two are blurred.  
 Practitioners in social work and conflict resolution are engaged in debate around 
three key concepts related to self-determination, empowerment, and professional ethics. 
The newer and emerging frames of both fields are situated at parallel positions on the 
continuum of approaches to these key concepts, in their respective professions. These 
frames favor elicitive rather than prescriptive approaches and increased client self-
determination, a focus on transformation and empowerment rather than on problem-
solving alone, and a stance of engagement and advocacy towards intervention, rather 
than neutrality and impartiality. 
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 The issues at the margins of each discipline require serious intellectual 
consideration, particularly in terms of their implications for practice. For example, the 
debates in the field of social work, relating to individual change versus environmental 
change, and prevention versus rehabilitation, mirror similar debates in the field of 
conflict resolution. Increased interchange between the two fields has the potential to 
contribute to the development of innovative approaches to transforming social conflicts 
and promoting positive social change. Such innovation is to be found in the intersection 
of the margins of the two fields, especially in the emerging structural frame of conflict 
resolution and the ecosystems frame of social work.  
 The newer and emerging frames of both fields are concerned with the problems 
and conflicts that result from the structures and systems in which they occur. At the 
margins of both, a new goal is increasingly becoming explicit, which is to find ways to 
simultaneously address the immediate problems or conflicts and change those 
structures and systems. Intellectual collaboration at these margins can lead to enhanced 
exploration of how these fields can extend the empowerment of individuals and groups, 
and the transformation of relationships, to the transformation of the over-arching 
systems and structures in which those individuals and groups are embedded. This, 
clearly, would be a major contribution to the social sciences. 
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